






ADVANCING NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES 
IN A TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT 
MARKETA TRIMBLE* 
ABSTRACT 
 The increasing frequency with which activities involving intellectual 
property (“IP”) cross national borders now warrants a clear definition of the 
territorial reach of national IP laws so that parties engaging in the activities 
can operate with sufficient notice of the laws applicable to their activities.  Leg-
islators, however, have not devoted adequate attention to the territorial delinea-
tion of IP law; in fact, legislators rarely draft IP statutes with any considera-
tion of cross-border scenarios, and with few exceptions IP laws are designed 
with only single-country scenarios in mind.  Delineating the reach of national 
IP laws is actually a complex matter because the reach depends not only on 
substantive IP law, but also on conflict of laws rules.  Yet until recently conflict 
of laws rules had rarely been considered or drafted with IP issues in mind.  In 
some countries, such as Switzerland, Poland, and China, legislators have re-
viewed conflict of laws rules in light of IP laws and passed conflict of laws 
statutes with IP-specific provisions; the European Union has IP-specific provi-
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sions in its instruments on conflict of laws as well.  In the United States, how-
ever, state conflict of laws rules provide no IP-specific rules, nor does the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which federal courts apply when 
deciding federal question cases. 
 This Article argues that because of the rising importance of cross-border 
IP activities and the increasing need for clear territorial delineation of IP laws, 
it is important for legislators to give equal consideration to cross-border and 
single-country scenarios when drafting legislation and to calibrate the territori-
al scope of national IP laws with conflict of laws rules to achieve the desired 
territorial reach of national IP policies.  This Article analyzes the interaction of 
IP laws and conflict of laws rules and reviews from both the IP law and the 
conflict of laws perspectives the various tools that are available to define the ter-
ritorial reach of national IP laws.  The fact that legislators deal with numerous 
“moving pieces” (particularly the conflict of laws rules of foreign countries) 
when they design the territorial reach of national laws should not discourage 
the legislators from striving to improve certainty about the territorial reach of 
national laws.  Depending on the degree to which the “moving pieces” limit leg-
islators’ ability to improve the certainty, countries may wish to negotiate and 
enter into international agreements in order to set uniform conflict of laws 
rules and define the limits of the territorial reach of national IP laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The increasing interest in cross-border aspects of IP litigation, 
observable in recent years, has focused on two types of issues: estab-
lishing the territorial scope of substantive IP laws on the one hand 
and designing and applying conflict of laws rules in IP cases on the 
other.1  The existing literature addresses the two types of issues in 
great detail,2 but treats the two types of issues mostly separately, with-
                                                        
 1.  See infra Part I for the definition of conflict of laws rules. 
 2.  Examples of recent literature include JENS ADOLPHSEN, EUROPÄISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT IN PATENTSACHEN (2005); JAMES J. FAWCETT &  
PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); 
MARTA PERTEGÁS SENDER, CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2002); STIG STRÖMHOLM, COPYRIGHT AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE 
SURVEY (2010); W. R. Cornish, Intellectual Property Infringement and Private International Law: 
Changing the Common Law Approach, 45 GRUR INT. 285 (1996); François Dessemontet, In-
ternational Private Law of Intellectual Property, in VI YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 71, 71–84 (Petar Šarčević et al. eds., 2005); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private 
International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 
(2010); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recog-
nition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002); Paul 
Edward Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues, 51 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315 (2004); Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Re-
thinking International Copyright in a Digitally Networked World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571 
(1996); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of Technological 
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out sufficiently recognizing that it is the interaction of the territorial 
scope of substantive IP laws, conflict of laws rules, and a country’s 
physical ability to enforce its laws that delineates the effective territo-
rial scope of national IP laws.3  This Article analyzes the interaction 
and identifies tools that legislators may utilize to influence the effec-
tive territorial scope of national IP laws.  How far national laws actual-
ly reach is of great importance today as cross-border activities are the 
normal and not the exceptional course of business; because of the 
cross-border nature of the activities, legislators need to seek advance-
ment of national IP policies not only through substantive IP laws but 
also through conflict of laws rules. 
Recent developments have raised awareness of how important it 
is to delineate clearly the territorial scope of substantive IP laws and 
have shown why specialized conflict of laws rules would be useful.  For 
instance, recent United States Supreme Court cases, such as Microsoft 
v. AT&T4 and Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,5 have highlighted 
the complexities of applying U.S. IP laws to cross-border issues, while 
the Court’s 2010 decision in Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd.6 
stirred debate about the delineation of the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. legislation in general.  The Morrison decision criticized courts 
for applying incorrectly the presumption against extraterritoriality—
the presumption that legislators enact laws effective only for the terri-
tory of their country unless they state otherwise7—and instructed 
                                                        
Change, 273 RECUEIL DES COURS 239, 239–406 (1998).  For older literature see infra notes 
12, 13, and 23. 
 3.  See infra Part I for the definition of a country’s enforcement power and the effec-
tive territorial scope of national IP laws.  On the recognition of the role that conflict of 
laws rules play in defining the territorial scope of substantive laws (but not specifically IP 
laws) see infra note 51.  On the increasing realization of the significance of the role of con-
flict of laws rules in areas of substantive law see, e.g., Veerle Van Den Eeckhout, The In-
strumentalisation of Private International Law: Quo Vadis? (Oct. 10, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2338375. 
 4.  550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 5.  133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 6.  561 U.S. 247 (2010).  Morrison did not concern IP statutes; on the impact that the 
decision might have on IP law see Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 
34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 581, 602–08 (2012).  See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 7.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255–57; see, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabi-
an American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 
285 (1949).  For a brief history of the presumption and its critique see, e.g., John H. Knox, 
The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 635 (2011).  Out-
side the United States a presumption against extraterritoriality might not be officially for-
mulated but is nevertheless respected by courts de facto.  See, e.g., Ryuichi Yamakawa, 
Transnational Dimension of Japanese Labor and Employment Laws: New Choice of Law Rules and 
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courts to apply the presumption strictly;8 the decision also implied 
that Congress must pay greater attention to the territorial design of 
legislation, particularly if Congress intends for a particular piece of 
legislation to have any extraterritorial application.9 
The increased concern about the delineation of the extraterrito-
rial effects of U.S. legislation coincides with a cluster of initiatives that 
have appeared in recent years to draft proposals for special conflict of 
laws rules for IP cases; a committee of the American Law Institute and 
three groups of scholars in Europe and Asia have developed such 
proposals,10 and an International Law Association committee is the 
                                                        
Determination of Geographical Reach, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 347, 365 (2010) (“[S]ince 
the territoriality is the most traditional principle of jurisdiction in international jurisdic-
tions, it is necessary for the courts [in Japan] to find at least some legislative intent to apply 
statutes extraterritorially.”). 
 8.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (“The results of judicial-speculation-made law—divining 
what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—
demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  Rather than guess 
anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background 
against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”).   
 9.  Cf. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (suggesting that the presumption against extraterrito-
riality may be displaced under some circumstances).  “[E]ven where the claims touch and 
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”  Id.  After Morrison, the reaction of 
Congress was immediate; Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act very shortly after the Supreme Court released the Morrison decision.  
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  For a discussion of the effects of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on the extraterritorial application 
of the statute, see Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the 
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 535, 546–47 (2012). 
 10.  AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, 
CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008); EUROPEAN MAX 
PLANCK GRP. ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY (2013); TRANSPARENCY 
PROPOSAL ON JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRANSPARENCY OF JAPANESE LAW 
PROJECT, (2009), available at http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-
u.ac.jp/ip/pdf/Transparency%20RULES%20%202009%20Nov1.pdf; KOREAN PRIVATE 
INT’L LAW ASSOC., PRINCIPLES ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION 
(2010) (on file with author).  In addition, the projects have produced rich resources for 
further research in notes and commentaries to the principles and articles authored by 
team members.  See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: JURISDICTION, 
APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE U.S. 
(Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2010); Annette Kur & Benedetta Ubertazzi, The ALI Principles 
and the CLIP Project: A Comparison, in LITIGATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU REGULATIONS, ALI PRINCIPLES, CLIP PROJECT 89, 89–147 
(Stefania Bariatti ed., 2010); Benedetta Ubertazzi, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Intellectual Property: A Comparison for the International Law Association, 3 J. INTELL. 
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latest group to work on a proposal for such special rules.11  The inter-
est in the intersection of conflict of laws and IP is not new; as early as 
1889, for example, German conflict of laws expert Carl Ludwig von 
Bar included an entire chapter on conflict of laws and IP in his con-
flict of laws treatise.12  In the 1970s, attempts to draft IP-specialized 
conflict of laws rules emerged when European scholars, such as Pro-
fessor Eugen Ulmer, assisted in designing one of the then-future Eu-
ropean Communities instruments on conflict of laws.13  The recent 
wave of interest in conflict of laws was propelled by the failure to con-
clude a large-scale international treaty on conflict of laws, and lately 
the interest has been underscored by the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law’s 2012 reopening of negotiations of such a 
treaty.14  IP-related issues were among the reasons for the failure of 
the Hague Conference’s earlier attempts in the 1990s and early 2000s 
to conclude a treaty, and therefore IP issues are among the hurdles 
that the negotiators might be expected to overcome in this round.15 
While territorial delineation of IP laws and the development of 
IP-specific conflict of laws rules have received a great deal of attention 
in recent years, national legislation has largely lagged behind this in-
crease in attention.16  Legislators typically think of national laws as ap-
                                                        
PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 306 (2012).  For difficulties associated with de-
fining “IP disputes” see infra note 24. 
 11.  ILA Committee on Intellectual Property and Private International Law, INT’L L. ASS’N, 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1037 (last visited August 28, 2013). 
 12.  2 CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THEORIE UND PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN 
PRIVATRECHTS 231–91 (1889).  In civil law countries the term for conflict of laws is “private 
international law.”  Some may argue that the two terms do not coincide perfectly; however, 
for the purposes of this Article the two terms may be equated.  For the definition of “con-
flict of laws” see infra Part I. 
 13.  EUGEN ULMER, DIE IMMATERIALGÜTERRECHTE IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT: 
RECHTSVERGL, SCHRIFTENREIHE ZUM GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ (1975); Paul H. Neu-
haus, Die Immaterialgüterrechte im Künftigen Internationalen Privatrecht der Europäischen Gemein-
schaften, in 40 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT 
189, 189–232 (B. Aubin et al. eds., 1976).  The European Communities were the predeces-
sors of the current European Union (“EU”). 
 14.  See generally, The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=149 (last visited Sept. 22, 
2014). 
 15.  See PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
ANNOTATED CHECKLIST OF ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED BY THE WORKING GROUP ON 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 13–14 (2013), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/hidden/2013/jdgm2013note01en.pdf. 
 16.  Although the above-mentioned principles for conflict of laws in IP cases have not 
yet been adopted by national legislators or international negotiators, courts have begun to 
refer to the principles.  See, e.g., Rundquist v. Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 132 (D.D.C. 
2011); Case C-616/10, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Solvay v. Honeywell, 
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plying only within the borders of their country.  There are of course 
exceptions—laws that are purposefully designed to reach beyond the 
borders of a country17—but most laws do not fall into this exceptional 
category.  Traditionally, national IP laws have also been designed to 
apply only within national borders, since they have been considered 
to be purely domestic laws with rights conferred by the laws limited to 
the territory of the particular country.18  Only in unique circumstanc-
es have legislators added provisions in IP laws that address issues 
crossing national borders;19 legislators have left other cross-border IP 
issues for the courts to clarify,20 presumably because the issues have 
arisen so infrequently that legislators have felt no need to render na-
tional policies into legal solutions for cross-border issues.21  Except for 
a few notable examples,22 IP statutes and conflict of laws statutes have 
been designed with negligible or no coordinated mutual input.23 
                                                        
2012 E.C.R. fn. 24; Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags et al., 2011 E.C.R. fn. 31; 
Case C-170/12, Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, 2013 E.C.R. fn. 53; Lucasfilm Ltd. v. 
Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 [93–94] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 17.  E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
 18.  See infra Part III for a discussion of the principle of territoriality. 
 19.  See, e.g., Patents and Protection of Patent Rights, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)–(g) (2012). 
 20.  See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communica-
tions Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 21.  The legislative lack of awareness of the interaction can be explained by both the 
historical rarity of cross-border IP disputes and the limited interest among experts from 
both areas in the interaction of the areas.  See, e.g., Graeme Dinwoodie, The Architecture of 
the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 996 (2002) (“[T]he 
cases that courts were called upon to resolve principally involved national rights [and] the 
disputes that confronted courts were largely national in nature.”); see also STRÖMHOLM, su-
pra note 2, at 57–60. 
 22.  See, e.g., Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters art. 16.4, Sept. 27, 1968, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 36 
[hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 
[hereinafter Brussels I Regulation (recast)]; Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 1, 2011), Art. 48; Portuguese Civil Code, art. 48. 
 23.  For examples of early scholarship on conflict of laws in intellectual property dis-
putes see, e.g., Heinz W. Auerswald, Können Ansprüche wegen Verletzung eines ausländischen 
Patents vor deutschen Gerichten verfolgt werden?, in FESTSCHRIFT WERNER VON STEIN 8 (1961); 
Alois Troller, Europäisierung des Patentrechts und Gerichtsstand, 1955 GRUR INT. 529; Frie-
drich Groß, Wie mache ich im Inland Ansprüche aus Schutzrechten geltend, deren Verletzung im 
Ausland erfolgt ist?, 1957 GRUR INT. 346; Otto-Friedrich Frhr. von Gamm, Die internationale 
und örtliche Zuständigkeit im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, in 50 MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN 
PATENTANWÄLTE 212 (1959); von Bar, supra note 12. 
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A single-country perspective, however, has now become an un-
suitable starting point for legislating; as globalization has intensified 
the flow of IP across national borders it has brought into doubt the 
premise that national policies can be sufficiently implemented 
through laws that are designed to address only single-country activi-
ties.  Not only do the well-publicized cases mentioned above illustrate 
the rising importance of cross-border activities, but recent scholarship 
also suggests that the number of cross-border IP disputes—IP disputes 
that involve parties located or conduct occurring in multiple coun-
tries—is increasing.24  Even though only a small fraction of daily activi-
ties result in the legal disputes that appear in the statistics reported in 
the scholarship, it seems reasonable to assume that together with 
cross-border disputes all cross-border activities concerning IP are on 
the rise.25 
With cross-border IP activities assuming a more prominent role 
in national economies, it is important for legislators to take cross-
border scenarios into account when they design IP laws to implement 
national policies.  Clearly identifying how far national laws reach 
should be one of legislators’ most important tasks; a clear delineation 
of the reach of national laws helps businesses and individuals adjust 
their conduct to comply with a country’s laws.  Clarity in the reach of 
national laws is, therefore, no less important for legal certainty than is 
clarity in the substance of national laws.26  A presumption against extra-
                                                        
 24.  See, e.g., Kimberley A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497 
(2003); Marketa Trimble, When Foreigners Infringe Patents: An Empirical Look at the Involve-
ment of Foreign Defendants in Patent Litigation in the U.S., 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 499 (2011); Marketa Trimble, Foreigners in U.S. Patent Litigation: An Empirical 
Study of Patent Cases Filed in Nine U.S. Federal District Courts in 2004, 2009, and 2012, 17 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2014).  The studies reported in the three articles 
concerned patent cases, particularly patent infringement cases.  Apart from IP rights in-
fringement disputes that clearly are “IP disputes,” it is difficult to determine all the kinds 
of disputes that should be covered by the term “IP disputes.”  Disputes about infringe-
ments and the validity of IP rights are certainly within the category, while licensing dis-
putes and bankruptcy proceedings involving IP are among the types of disputes whose in-
clusion in the category tends to be debated.  This Article refers to “IP disputes” in general, 
with the understanding that it refers primarily to disputes about infringement and validity. 
 25.  The increase in the cross-border flow of IP may be inferred from the general trend 
in world merchandise exports and imports: worldwide, exports increased from $59 billion 
in 1948 to $17,930 trillion in 2012, and imports increased from $62 billion in 1948 to 
$18,188 trillion in 2012.  WORLD TRADE ORG., INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2013, at 
22–23 (2013), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf. 
 26.  See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Extraterritoriality, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 
ANN. MEETING PAPER, 18–19 (2011) (suggesting that in the regulatory context territorial 
delineation might be even more important than substantive precision).   
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territoriality can be a helpful tool that enhances the certainty of the 
territorial reach of national laws; however, it is only a presumption, 
and legislators’ silence about the intended territorial scope of nation-
al laws, which is prevalent in national legislation, cannot be taken to 
indicate that legislators have made a deliberate choice concerning the 
territorial scope of the laws that is in line with national policies. 
This Article analyzes the interaction of the territorial scope of 
substantive IP laws, conflict of laws rules, and a country’s physical abil-
ity to enforce its laws, and reviews the tools that legislators can utilize 
to delineate the effective territorial scope of IP laws.27  Many observa-
tions made in this Article apply generally to the effective territorial 
scope of any substantive laws, and some critics may argue that the 
analysis should consider the problem of the territorial delineation of 
substantive laws generally, without focusing on a particular area of 
substantive law.28  However, concentrating on a concrete area of law 
allows the analysis to demonstrate particular flexibilities that legisla-
tors may utilize to shape the effective territorial scope of substantive 
laws in the area, and provide specific examples of the use of the flexi-
bilities. 
                                                        
One can defend vagueness in standards that regulate primary conduct by argu-
ing that postponing definition of legal requirements until application allows the 
regulator to exploit information that was hidden at the time of the standard’s 
promulgation.  No such argument applies to domain rules.  Uncertainty about 
the applicable legal regime, as opposed to the particular rule governing primary 
conduct, only encourages opportunism by persons who, after the fact, find ap-
plication of a particular regime beneficial.   
Id.; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
121 (forthcoming 2014) (“The underlying objective of due process in the extraterritorial 
prescriptive jurisdiction context is essentially fair notice of the law applicable to primary 
conduct when and where the conduct occurs . . . .”). 
 27.  Two notes should be made at the outset: First, this Article takes a comparative per-
spective; whenever possible, it provides examples of actual cases decided by courts of vari-
ous countries and of rules that exist under laws at the international, regional, and national 
levels, with an emphasis on U.S. legislation and case law.  The cases and rules are men-
tioned as illustrations of the problems discussed in the Article, which does not aspire to 
provide an exhaustive account of all reported cases and all existing rules related to the 
problems discussed.  Second, the Article focuses on horizontal conflicts, that is, one coun-
try’s IP laws vis-à-vis other countries’ IP laws, and does not discuss vertical conflicts, which 
include conflicts such as international versus national, regional versus national, and feder-
al versus state conflicts arising in a single jurisdiction.  Horizontal conflicts, as opposed to 
vertical conflicts, include conflicts such as country A’s federal law versus country B’s state 
law, and country A’s national law versus regional law directly applicable in country B. 
 28.  Colangelo, supra note 26, at 107 (“For too long, the phenomenon of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction has been addressed piecemeal in the disparate substantive fields in which 
it happens to pop up.”). 
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Using examples from various IP laws, Part I explains the interac-
tions of the territorial scope of substantive IP laws, conflict of laws 
rules, and a country’s physical ability to enforce its laws; the results of 
the interactions define the effective territorial scope of national IP 
laws, which should ideally be shaped in accordance with national IP 
policies.  Because the ability of conflict of laws rules to assist in ad-
vancing national IP policies may not be readily apparent, Part II pro-
ceeds by discussing the role that conflict of laws rules play in the im-
plementation of national policies.  For legislators to be able to adjust 
conflict of laws rules and substantive IP laws to serve the policies, the 
legislators must enjoy some flexibility to amend the rules and the laws; 
Parts III and IV analyze the flexibility that is available to legislators, 
and show that although some limitations are placed on countries’ leg-
islation in the two areas of law, sufficient flexibility remains for legisla-
tors to shape the rules and laws.  The flexibility can be utilized with 
the assistance of various tools from the two areas of law, and Part V re-
views such tools.  Finally, Part VI provides two examples that illustrate 
the utility of the calibration of the territorial scope of IP laws and con-
flict of laws rules to achieve particular national IP policy goals. 
Some conflict of laws experts may object to the use of conflict of 
laws rules to achieve the goals of substantive national policies (the so-
called “instrumentalization” of conflict of laws rules);29 critics may in-
sist that the rules ought to reflect solely those policies that typically af-
fect conflict of laws rules (such as policies related to the administra-
tion of justice and the safeguarding of procedural rights).  This 
Article, however, suggests that conflict of laws rules have been used 
instrumentally to support national substantive policies, that the rules 
should contribute to the implementation of substantive policies, in-
cluding IP policies, and that in the globalized world the rules are in 
fact indispensable to the implementation of substantive policies. 
While this Article analyzes how conflict of laws rules can be uti-
lized in the design of the effective territorial reach of national IP laws, 
it does not attempt to identify any specific national IP policies that 
should be promoted, nor does it advocate for or against any specific 
rights and interests that should be reflected in IP legislation.  Natural-
ly, the identification of particular policies, rights, and interests is cru-
cial for making decisions about the content and the optimal effective 
                                                        
 29.  Cf. Jack J. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1233 (1998) 
(“[I]n designing choice-of-law rules or standards, it is better to begin at the micro rather 
than macro level, and to examine recurrent fact patterns and implicated interests in dis-
crete legal contexts rather than devise a general context-transcendent theory of con-
flicts.”); see generally, Van Den Eeckhout, supra note 3.  
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territorial scope of IP laws; however, the discussion and the selection 
of the optimal policies, rights, and interests that should be reflected 
in national IP laws is beyond the scope of this Article. 
This Article makes four major points: (1) How far IP laws actually 
reach depends not only on substantive IP law, but also on conflict of 
laws rules, and countries’ physical abilities to enforce the laws; these 
components delineate the effective territorial scope of national IP 
laws; (2) Legislators should calibrate substantive IP laws and conflict 
of laws rules to achieve the effective territorial reach that they deem 
optimal;30  (3) If legislators cannot enact conflict of laws rules because 
they have limited power to do so or because of other limitations (for 
example, because of international instruments that mandate certain 
conflict of laws rules), they should consider alternative means to in-
fluence the effective territorial reach of national IP laws; (4) At the 
international level, it is unlikely that countries will achieve complete 
uniformity in the effective territorial scope of IP laws: such uniformity 
would require the international harmonization of both the territorial 
scope of substantive IP laws and conflict of laws rules, and such har-
monization is unlikely to happen in the near future. 
I.  THE EFFECTIVE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAWS 
Delineating the territorial reach of national laws is a complicated 
exercise.  The territorial scope of national laws, such as IP laws, is of-
ten equated with the territorial reach of prescriptive jurisdiction;31 the 
laws are expected to apply within the country, and whether they reach 
beyond the national borders of the country (whether they have an ex-
traterritorial effect) is a decision for either legislators when they adopt 
national legislation or courts when they interpret the legislation.32  
Legislators sometimes do choose to formulate the intended reach of 
prescriptive jurisdiction in a statute; for example, Section 271(a) of 
the U.S. Patent Act defines as “infringing” the acts of making, using, 
                                                        
 30.  The optimal territorial reach might not always be the maximum possible territorial 
reach, as one of the examples in Part VI infra demonstrates. 
 31.  “[J]urisdiction to prescribe” means the power of a state “to make its law applicable 
to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, wheth-
er by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by de-
termination of a court.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987).  
International law and constitutions pose limits on the proper reach of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion. 
 32.  Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 505 (1997). 
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offering to sell, or selling “any patented invention, within the United 
States or import[ing] into the United States any patented inven-
tion.”33  In other instances, the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction will 
result from judicial interpretation; for example, Section 271(b) has 
been interpreted by U.S. courts to reach those who actively induce in-
fringement of a U.S. patent even when they act outside the United 
States.34  Absent legislative language, the presumption is that national 
legislators legislate solely for the territory of their own country.35 
The territorial reach of prescriptive jurisdiction is not, however, 
identical to the effective territorial scope of substantive laws—the terri-
tory in which the laws are truly enforced; the effective territorial scope 
is usually smaller than the territorial reach of prescriptive jurisdiction.  
For example, Section 271(b) intends to stop inducements of in-
fringement of a U.S. patent, even when the acts of inducement occur 
outside the United States; however, the United States will not always 
succeed in actually stopping or remedying acts that occur outside its 
territory, particularly if the infringer who induced patent infringe-
ment has no presence or assets in the United States.  Although the 
U.S. Patent Act is intended to reach activity outside the United States, 
de facto the Act might not be effective in all places where such activity 
might occur; the Act’s effective territorial scope is smaller than its in-
tended territorial reach. 
Whether a national law is effective outside its country—what the 
effective territorial scope of the national law is—depends on three 
components.  The first component is the intended territorial reach of 
the substantive laws as it is envisioned by legislators in their notion of 
the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction, or in the interpretation by the 
national courts regarding the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction.36  The 
other two components are conflict of laws rules—both national rules 
and the rules of other countries—and the enforcement power of 
countries that may be involved in the enforcement of the laws.37  Con-
flict of laws rules comprise rules of jurisdiction, choice of law rules, 
and rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; 
                                                        
 33.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).  Cf. infra Part IV (discussing a certain degree of flexibil-
ity available in interpreting the territorial scope of this provision). 
 34.  35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012); see, e.g., Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1302–
03 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Honeywell Int’l. Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. 
Tex. 2009).  
 35.  See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 36.  See supra note 31 for a definition of prescriptive jurisdiction. 
 37.  See Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 1216 (noting that “the effective scope of [a coun-
try’s] law depends on [the country’s] ability to enforce it”). 
  
2015] ADVANCING NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 215 
these rules determine when courts can adjudicate a dispute, which 
country’s law the courts will apply and under what circumstances, and 
whether the courts will recognize and enforce judgments rendered in 
other countries.38 
The enforcement power in this context means the power to 
achieve compliance with the law—not just passing legislation and ad-
judicating violations of the law, but actually enforcing the law, which 
means securing remedies and achieving compliance with the law.39  
                                                        
 38.  Some authors have argued that the court practice in the United States developed 
such that, in the context of federal legislation, the analysis of extraterritoriality (the extent 
of prescriptive jurisdiction) has displaced the choice of law analysis, while in the context of 
state legislation, the choice of law analysis has displaced the analysis of extraterritoriality.  
According to the authors, the result is that litigants who do not succeed with claims based 
on U.S. federal statutes because of insufficient extraterritorial effects of the statutes (for 
example, because of the strict application of the presumption against extraterritoriality) 
turn to alternative claims based on state law that is easily extended extraterritorially 
through choice of law.  This assessment suggests that for U.S. federal statutes, choice of law 
rules play a lesser role in co-defining the statute’s effective territorial scope.  However, 
choice of law analysis does play a role in defining the territorial reach of federal statutes 
when the analysis is conducted vis-à-vis foreign-country law (that is, a party pleads foreign 
law and it is a type of foreign law that a court in the United States could apply).  For the 
difference in defining the territorial scope of applicability of federal versus state laws see 
Florey, supra note 9, at 548–49, 552–53; Colangelo, supra note 26, at 144–46.  The reasons 
for the prevalence of the assessment of extraterritoriality (as opposed to choice of law 
analysis) for federal statutes may include, in addition to the reasons explored by Florey, 
supra note 9 at 553, the fact that “the majority of [federal law] cases involve statutes, most 
of which are of a public-law character.”  SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (2008).  On the “public law taboo” that can prevent U.S. courts 
from conducting choice of law analysis see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Inves-
tors Under U.S. Federal Securities Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 174–75 (2012). 
 39.  The term “enforcement power” is not identical to the term “jurisdiction to en-
force” that was used in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987) and 
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965).  “Jurisdiction to en-
force,” as defined in the Restatements, places limits on a country’s ambition to enforce its 
laws and regulations.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(c) (1987); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 6–7 (1965).  As the Introductory 
Note to the chapter on Jurisdiction to Enforce of the 1987 Restatement explains, the Re-
statement set out to resolve “uncertainty as to where reasonable pursuit of one state’s juris-
diction to enforce its law ends, and unwarranted intrusion into another state’s jurisdiction 
begins.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987), pt. IV, ch. 3, intro. 
note.  While “jurisdiction to enforce” sets limits on when countries may enforce their laws 
and regulations (based on international law), the “enforcement power” defines when 
countries can enforce their laws and regulations (based on countries’ physical abilities to 
enforce). 
In the 1987 Restatement, “jurisdiction to enforce” is defined as “jurisdiction . . . to in-
duce or compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, 
whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonju-
dicial action.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987), § 401(c).  A 
Comment to the 1965 Restatement defined “jurisdiction to ‘enforce’” as 
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The territorial scope of the enforcement power of a country covers 
the territory in which the country is capable of enforcing its laws on 
its own, without the assistance of other countries.  Successful en-
forcement without assistance from other countries requires the pres-
ence in the country of a defendant and/or his assets, or the ability of 
the country to enforce the laws against third parties whose services fa-
cilitate the defendant’s activity and who have a sufficient presence in 
the country; for example, enforcement may be directed at internet 
service providers or payment processors.40 
An inducement example illustrates the role of conflict of laws 
rules and the enforcement power in affecting the effective territorial 
scope of national laws: Assume that an infringer induces the in-
fringement of a U.S. patent through acts committed in Germany, and 
that he and his assets are located in Germany.  Although the U.S. Pa-
tent Act is designed to reach the infringing acts and the infringer in 
Germany, without Germany’s assistance the Act will not be enforced 
against the infringer because the United States has no enforcement 
power in Germany.  Germany might enforce U.S. laws against the in-
fringer, but only if German courts are either willing to recognize and 
enforce a U.S. judgment (based on the U.S. Patent Act) against the 
infringer, or are willing to adjudicate the infringement under the U.S. 
Patent Act and then enforce their judgment against the infringer. 
Figures 1 and 2 below help explain the interaction of the three 
types of components and demonstrate the difficulties of delineating 
the effective territorial scope of national laws.41  The figures present 
simplified models that involve the enforcement of the IP laws of a sin-
                                                        
the capacity of a state under international law to enforce a rule of law, whether 
this capacity be exercised by the judicial or the executive branch, as is normally 
the case in the United States, or by some other branch of government, as may be 
the case in states with differing forms of government.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965), § 6 cmt. a.  On the insuffi-
cient clarity of the term in the 1965 Restatement see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the 
International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interac-
tion, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 434 n.105 (1979). 
 40.  See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2012); 
see also Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 1217. 
 41.  Three caveats should be mentioned: First, the figures are Venn diagrams in which 
the ovals portray the three components and a certain sets of scenarios; the diagrams are 
not geographical maps covering any physical areas.  Second, for simplification, the figures 
depict the scope of the territorial reach of conflict of laws rules and the scope of the en-
forcement power only to the extent that the scope of the reach and the scope of the power 
are relevant to the determination of the effective territorial scope of the single-country IP 
law that is illustrated by the figures.  Third, the diagrams are not intended to show the in-
dividual components to scale, and the sizes of the ovals and their positions in the figures 
do not correspond to any measure of the territorial scope of the components. 
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gle country (country A).  Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which 
country A obtains no assistance from other countries in the enforce-
ment of its IP laws; the figure shows the interrelationships of country 
A’s territorial scope of national IP laws, A’s conflict of laws rules, and 
A’s enforcement power.  The fact that the territorial scope of A’s IP 
laws and the territorial reach of A’s conflict of laws rules (the large 
oval with the dashed line) extend beyond the territorial scope of A’s 
enforcement power (the small oval with the solid line) suggests that 
A’s legislators have legislated for some scenarios in which A lacks en-
forcement power (which is not uncommon, and the inducement case 
above is an example of this scenario). 
 
The two dots in Figure 1 identify two different scenarios:42 In scenario 
1,43 all three components are present and country A is able to enforce its IP 
laws; the area where all three components overlap marks the effective terri-
torial scope of A’s IP laws when A relies on only its own enforcement power.  
In scenario 2,44 the enforcement power of country A is missing, which means 
                                                        
 42.  The scenarios in this section provide examples of situations that fall within the dif-
ferent areas of the Venn diagrams; other scenarios may also fall within these areas. 
 43.  Scenario 1: A’s resident infringes a patent granted in A through an infringing act 
committed in A.  A’s courts have jurisdiction over the infringer because he is domiciled in 
A.  A’s courts apply A’s law to the infringing act, and A enforces the judgment against the 
defendant. 
 44.  Scenario 2: An infringer commits an act that is infringing in A but the infringer is 
not domiciled or located in A and has no assets in A.  A’s courts have jurisdiction over the 
infringer based on the place of the tortious activity, and A’s courts apply A’s laws.  Howev-
er, A’s laws will not be enforced in this single-country scenario because A cannot enforce 
the resulting judgment on its own.  See, e.g., Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Shepperton Design Studios 
Ltd., 2006 WL 6672241 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006).  In Lucasfilm, the defendant, who was 
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that country A on its own, without the assistance of other countries, cannot 
enforce its IP laws even though its legislators intended for its laws to apply in 
that scenario. 
Figure 1 presents a hypothetical model for a cross-border scenario; it 
would be very unusual for a country to rely solely on its own enforcement 
power when enforcing its laws; under normal circumstances, A would enjoy 
some assistance from other countries.  Figure 2 shows the more realistic case 
of what happens when another country lends its assistance to A; Figure 2 is 
another simplified model, this time involving two countries—country A and 
country B—both enforcing A’s laws; the model is simplified because it is pos-
sible that more than just one country may be available to assist A in the en-
forcement of A’s laws.45 
 
Figure 2 adds three gray ovals for country B to the two black ovals for 
country A from Figure 1.  The dashed-line gray oval represents the territorial 
scope of A’s laws based on B’s conflict of laws rules; it covers all instances in 
which B considers A’s laws applicable, and it is smaller than the dashed-line 
black oval because country B does not consider A’s laws applicable to all in-
stances to which country A does.  The solid-line gray oval represents the terri-
torial scope of B’s enforcement power, and the dotted-line gray oval repre-
                                                        
domiciled in the United Kingdom, was sued in the United States (country A) for copyright 
infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition under both federal and 
state laws; the defendant committed the acts through internet pages that were accessible 
from California.  Id.  The plaintiff sought recognition and enforcement of the resulting 
default judgment against the defendant in the United Kingdom but recognition of the 
U.S. default judgment was denied.  See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 45.  In any given case the number of countries available to assist in the enforcement of 
A’s laws will be limited according to the number of countries whose conflict of laws rules 
and enforcement power allow them to assist in the enforcement of A’s laws. 
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sents the territorial scope of the jurisdiction of B’s courts.46  The five scenari-
os identified in Figure 2 illustrate how the presence or absence of any of the 
three components influences the enforceability—or, the effectiveness—of 
A’s IP laws.47  In each of the scenarios in Figure 2, A cannot enforce its laws 
                                                        
 46.  “Jurisdiction of B’s courts” refers to adjudicatory jurisdiction, both personal and 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 47.  Scenario 3: A person domiciled in a third country infringes copyright in A.  A’s 
courts have jurisdiction over the infringer based on the place of the tortious activity; B’s 
courts have jurisdiction over the infringer because he regularly conducts business in B.  
However, the infringer is present in neither A nor B, and his assets are all located outside 
of A and B.  Because neither A nor B have enforcement power over the infringer, A’s laws 
will not be enforced even though A and B agree that A’s laws apply and that A’s and B’s 
courts can adjudicate the infringement. 
Scenario 4: The same facts as in scenario 3 except that for some reason B’s courts will 
not apply A’s laws to the infringing acts if they adjudicate the case.  Because neither A nor 
B have enforcement power over the infringer, A’s laws will not be enforced. 
Scenario 5: A person domiciled and residing in B infringes copyright in A; A’s courts 
have jurisdiction over the infringer based on the place of the tortious activity.  B’s courts 
have jurisdiction over the infringer because he is domiciled in B, and B also has enforce-
ment power over the infringer who resides in B.  Because the infringer is not present in A 
and has no assets in A, A lacks enforcement power over the infringer.  Nevertheless, A’s 
laws can be enforced if B assists with the enforcement because B has enforcement power 
and agrees that A’s laws apply.  Regardless of whether A’s or B’s courts adjudicate the case, 
A’s laws will be applied, and the resulting judgment will be enforced in B, which can en-
force its own courts’ judgment or recognize and enforce a judgment by A’s courts.  See, e.g., 
Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Shepperton Design Studios Ltd., 2006 WL 6672241 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 
2006); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also, su-
pra note 44 and infra note 122.  In Lucasfilm, the U.K. court (a court in country B) denied 
recognition of the U.S. judgment (a judgment from country A) but allowed the case to be 
relitigated in the United Kingdom under U.S. law. [2011] UKSC 39. 
Scenario 6: The same facts as in scenario 5 except that for some reason B’s courts will 
not apply A’s laws to the infringing acts.  If B’s courts adjudicate the case, they will apply 
the laws of a different country (different from A; they could be B’s own laws).  If A’s courts 
adjudicate the case based on A’s laws, B’s courts might not recognize and enforce the re-
sulting judgment of A’s courts; whether or not B’s courts recognize the judgment depends 
on the reasons for which B considers A’s prescriptive and/or adjudicatory jurisdiction in 
the case improper.  If the only reason is that B’s conflict of laws rules would direct B’s 
courts to apply the laws of some other country, B’s courts will probably recognize and en-
force A’s judgment even if it is based on A’s laws (as long as A’s court was the court in 
which the case was first filed).  If the reason is that the application of A’s laws or the 
ground for exercising jurisdiction of A’s courts is against B’s public policy, then B’s courts 
are unlikely to recognize the judgment of A’s courts.  See, e.g., Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l. v. 
Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. public policy to deny the 
recognition and enforcement of a French judgment that was based on French IP law 
against U.S.-domiciled defendants); see also infra notes 224 and 225. 
Scenario 7: A person domiciled in a third country infringes copyright in A.  A’s courts 
have jurisdiction over the infringer based on the place of the tortious activity; B’s courts 
have no jurisdiction over the infringer.  The infringer is present in neither A nor B, and 
his assets are also located outside A and B.  Because A has no enforcement power over the 
infringer, A’s laws will not be enforced.  B cannot assist in the enforcement of A’s laws; B’s 
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on its own because it has no enforcement power in those scenarios (all five 
scenarios are outside the black solid-line oval that represents A’s enforce-
ment power).  However, once A enjoys B’s assistance, the effective territorial 
scope of A’s IP laws becomes larger than it was when A had to rely on only its 
own enforcement power; in scenario 5 and in some circumstances also in 
scenario 6, A’s laws may now be enforced with the assistance of country B.48 
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the effective territorial scope of a 
country’s substantive laws, such as IP laws, does not correspond to the terri-
torial scope of the laws as intended by the country’s legislators (the black 
dashed-line oval).  But the effective territorial scope is also not confined to 
the territorial scope of the country’s own enforcement power (the black sol-
id-line oval); as Figure 2 shows, assistance by other countries may enlarge the 
effective territorial scope of a country’s substantive laws beyond the territori-
al scope of the country’s own enforcement power. 
While the effective territorial scope of substantive laws results from the 
interaction of the three types of components, legislators cannot adjust all of 
the components.  The territorial scope of the enforcement power seldom 
changes in its territorial scope; absent some changes in the territory of the 
country or in the ability of the country to control its territory (for example, 
changes occurring because of the cessation or occupation of a part of the 
territory), the territorial scope of the enforcement power typically remains 
constant.  A country also has limited, if any, ability to affect other countries’ 
conflict of laws rules; while legislators can adjust their country’s own conflict 
of laws rules, they cannot legislate conflict of laws rules for other nations.49 
Without the ability to influence the territorial scope of the enforcement 
power and foreign countries’ conflict of laws rules, legislators are left with 
only two of the three components that they can adjust to achieve the optimal 
effective territorial scope of substantive laws: the territorial scope of the 
country’s substantive laws and the country’s conflict of laws rules.  It will be 
in these two components where legislators must search for tools that can be 
used to make the desired territorial adjustments, and it will be these two 
components that legislators need to mutually coordinate to achieve the in-
tended effective territorial scope of substantive laws. 
As for the conflict of laws rules of other countries, an international trea-
ty would be required for countries to influence conflict of laws rules interna-
                                                        
courts have no jurisdiction over the infringer and B also has no enforcement power over 
the infringer. 
 48.  Because of B’s assistance, A can count on its laws being enforced in scenario 5, 
and, under certain circumstances, A’s laws will also be enforced in scenario 6.  See supra 
note 47 for the explanation of the necessary circumstances in scenario 6.  Therefore, sce-
narios 5 and 6 demonstrate the potential for the expansion of the effective territorial 
scope of A’s laws.  A’s laws remain unenforced in scenarios 3, 4, and 7 even when B is in-
volved. 
 49.  See infra Part III on the potential effects that foreign countries’ laws and practices 
may have on conflict of laws. 
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tionally and set a single standard for the rules.50  It will be incumbent upon 
legislators to evaluate how much their inability to affect foreign conflict of 
laws rules limits their success in defining the effective territorial scope of 
their own national laws with sufficient precision and certainty.  An agree-
ment at the international level on conflict of laws rules might be a necessary 
next step for countries to take if legislative success in delineating the territo-
rial scope of national laws is insufficient. 
II.  THE ROLE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES IN PROMOTING NATIONAL 
POLICIES 
It may seem that conflict of laws rules have no role to play in the im-
plementation of national policies; however, conflict of laws rules and nation-
al policies do interact, and they do so on two levels.  First, conflict of laws 
rules implement national policies that are inherent in the conflict of laws 
field, such as policies that concern the administration of justice, predictabil-
ity, uniformity of results, legal certainty, and procedural fairness—policies 
that typically affect procedural rules.  Second, conflict of laws rules define 
when national law applies; and therefore the rules de facto “legislate” sub-
stantive law in a given case and influence when national policies (in this case 
“substantive policies”—those that are implemented primarily in substantive 
laws) are promoted.51 
At the level of interaction that concerns substantive policies, conflict of 
laws rules interact with such policies in two different ways.  First, conflict of 
laws rules may be designed so that their application requires courts to take 
into consideration the content of substantive laws and thus the substantive 
policies that underlie the policies.  The interest analysis52 developed by the 
                                                        
 50.  So far, countries have not agreed on a large-scale conflict of laws treaty.  See The 
Judgments Project, supra note 14, and the discussion in Part III on limited conflict of laws 
treaties and regional conflict of laws instruments. 
 51.  The effects of choice of law rules on the territorial scope of substantive laws have 
long been recognized.  See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the 
Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 734 (1963) (“[The courts’] decisions 
[about choice of law] have in effect determined, for the particular case and similar cases 
presenting a like pattern of conflicting rules, the reach of the respective state laws.”); Ker-
mit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady 
Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2012) (“[C]hoice-of-law rules set the scope of state law.”).  
This aspect of the interaction is reflected in the application of the Erie doctrine in the 
United States; because of the impact that conflict of laws rules can have on the substantive 
outcome of court decisions, the rules are handled as substantive and not procedural for 
Erie doctrine purposes.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) 
(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); see also Colangelo, supra note 26, at 
141 (“Choice-of-law analyses that select U.S. forum law to regulate foreign conduct effec-
tively produce extraterritorial exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction.”).  
 52.  Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958); see also, e.g., SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-
LAW REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS: TODAY AND TOMORROW 14–24, 38 (2006). 
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American choice of law revolution is an example of a choice of law approach 
that requires courts to assess the substance of the potentially applicable laws 
and evaluate the respective states’ interests in promoting the policies.53  The 
“better law” approach,54 another product of the American choice of law revo-
lution, requires that courts compare substantive solutions adopted in the 
competing laws as one of the factors whose weighing leads to the selection of 
the applicable law.  The American choice of law revolution was not the first 
wave of scholars in choice of law who were concerned about the substance of 
the potentially applicable laws; many centuries before the revolution, the 
medieval Statutists also sought answers to choice of law questions in the sub-
stance of applicable laws.55 
Whether the application of conflict of laws rules should deliberately 
lead to the promotion of certain substantive policies has been debated.  The 
scholars who contend that substantive policies should not influence the ap-
plication of conflict of laws rules have searched for conflict of laws rules that 
would be neutral vis-à-vis the content of the substantive laws and the national 
policies that the laws implement.56  But even these scholars advocating sub-
stance-neutral rules sometimes have yielded to certain substantive policy con-
siderations; for example, in 1842, Carl Georg von Waechter suggested an ex-
ception to the rule of lex fori (which he advocated for torts) “in favor of a 
defendant who injured a foreign plaintiff in the latter’s own country which 
                                                        
 53.  See also Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International 
Copyright in A Digitally Networked World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 571, 574–78 (1996) 
(distinguishing between “categorical analysis” and “functional analysis” of choice of law 
issues). 
 54.  Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1584, 1587–88 (1966); see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 52, at 51. 
 55.  Statutists furthered “the concept that applicable law must be determined by look-
ing at the spatial reach of a certain rule of substantive law” by answering the question “over 
which (cross-border) legal situations does it claim application?”  MIREILLE M.M. VAN 
EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEX 
PROTECTIONIS 25 (2003); see also MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 29–30 (2d 
ed. 1950).  Magister Aldricus (in the twelfth century) suggested that “the judge should ap-
ply that law which seems to him the better and more useful.”  Id. at 22.  Because of their 
focus on the promotion of substantive policies similar to the method of promotion used by 
the Statutists, adherents to the interest analysis and other modern approaches have been 
referred to as “neo-Statutists.”  See TH. M. DE BOER, BEYOND LEX LOCI DELICTI: CONFLICTS 
METHODOLOGY AND MULTISTATE TORTS IN AMERICAN CASE LAW 5 (1987); VAN EECHOUD, 
supra, at 28.  
 56.  See, e.g., JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); 
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND THE LIMITS OF 
THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME (1972).  On the “functionalist” ap-
proach to conflict of laws (the approach according to which “choice-of-law rules should be 
attuned to the achievement of decisional harmony only”) and the “conflicts justice” ap-
proach (the approach according to which choice-of-law rules should promote “a neutral 
kind of justice, or justice on a supranational plane”), see Th. M. De Boer, Facultative Choice 
of Law: The Procedural Status of Choice-of-Law Rules and Foreign Law, 257 RECUEIL DES COURS, 
290–93 (1996).  
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refuses a remedy”57—an exception that appeared to be guided by a prefer-
ence for a certain substantive policy. 
The second way in which conflict of laws rules interact with substantive 
policies leads national policies to impact directly the design of conflict of 
laws rules.58  As De Boer explains, in these types of rules, “the function of 
substantive law has been translated into a connecting factor that refers to the 
legal environment of the party whose interests the forum has at heart.”59  For 
example, pro-consumer policies implemented in consumer protection laws 
may find their reflection in conflict of laws rules concerning choice of court 
agreements concluded in consumer contracts60 and in the rules for choice of 
national law that applies to such contracts.61 
The increasing proliferation of conflict of laws rules evidences a trend 
in which conflict of laws rules are designed with specific substantive policies 
in mind; special conflict of laws rules emerge that are designed for certain 
areas of law and for certain issues, and that are tailored to the policies that 
define the particular areas and issues.62  Intellectual property has not been 
excepted from this trend.  Although IP-specific conflict of laws rules have 
been legislated only recently and only in some countries,63 courts have de-
veloped IP-specific approaches to the application of general conflict of laws 
rules for decades.64  This early de facto conflict of laws rules proliferation in 
the area of IP occurred under the influence of strong policies that have un-
derpinned national IP laws and the international IP law system.65 
                                                        
 57.  3 ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG AND ERIK JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS LAW, INCLUDING THE 
LAW OF ADMIRALTY 65–66 (1977). 
 58.  Historically, the development that led to the designing of rules that reflect sub-
stantive policies evolved from the same dissatisfaction with the content-neutral approach 
to choice of law that propelled the American choice of law revolution.  See, e.g., De Boer, 
supra note 56, at 293–97. 
 59.  Id. at 295.  
 60.  Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22, at art. 19. 
 61.  Council Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of Council of 17 
June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 6, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 
[hereinafter Rome I Regulation]. 
 62.  See DE BOER, supra note 55, at 53 (“Increasingly, normative notions inherent in a 
legal system’s substantive law are transplanted to its choice of law rules, gradually changing 
the blunt features of the neutral allocation method.”).  On the trend of “instrumentalisa-
tion” of conflict of laws, see also, generally, Van Den Eeckhout, supra note 3, and Gold-
smith, supra note 29.  Some conflict of laws rules have been so tightly intertwined with sub-
stantive policies that the rules have appeared in substantive laws; Part III demonstrates 
examples of such “mixed rules,” in which conflict of laws rules are embedded in substan-
tive laws and used to promote particular substantive policies. 
 63.  See infra Part V for the discussion of IP-specific conflict of laws legislation. 
 64.  See infra Part V for examples of court-developed IP-specific conflict of laws rules 
and approaches. 
 65.  See infra Parts III and IV for the policies that have defined national and interna-
tional IP law. 
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The proliferation of conflict of laws rules reflects the recognition that 
the rules do play a significant role in promoting national IP policies.  Na-
tional policies on IP continue to differ among countries notwithstanding the 
significant degree of agreement that countries share on many of the policies; 
the agreement has led to harmonization of national IP laws at the interna-
tional level through a number of international treaties.66  A typical example 
of countries’ disagreement on IP policies is the exhaustion doctrine;67 a 
country that relies heavily on imports may prefer the rule of international 
exhaustion that facilitates competition in imports68 while a country that is a 
strong exporter may prefer the rule of national exhaustion that allows IP 
right holders to price discriminate and protect the domestic market from an 
influx of cheaper parallel imports.69  Guided by the desire to become the fu-
ture global center of the software industry a country may adopt copyright 
ownership rules to facilitate corporate ownership of copyright in software70 
and provide for sui generis protection of non-copyrightable aspects of data-
bases.71  A desire to protect authors and original copyright owners as weaker 
parties against those who license or acquire their copyrights and benefit 
from a later increase in the value of the copyrights may prompt countries to 
adopt measures that enable the authors and original copyright owners to re-
negotiate the transfers or licenses of their copyrights.72 
                                                        
 66.  See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 
9, 1896, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99–27 (1986) (as revised at Paris July 4, 1971 and amended 
Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  The most important IP treaties, such as 
the Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, and the TRIPS Agreement, have been widely 
adopted.  Regionally, an even greater degree of agreement has led to the adoption of re-
gional instruments that harmonize various aspects of IP law.   
 67.  Under the exhaustion doctrine, the IP right “owner’s initial authorized transfer of 
a copy of the work [or product] exhausts the owner’s right to control the distribution of 
that copy [or product].”  R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Net-
works, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 580 n.7 (2003); see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 6 
(recognizing countries’ disagreement on the exhaustion issue).  In U.S. copyright law the 
exhaustion doctrine is known as the “first sale doctrine.”  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 68.  Under the rule of international exhaustion, the first authorized sale of a copy or a 
product anywhere in the world exhausts the IP rights in the protecting country. 
 69.  Under the rule of national exhaustion, the first authorized sale of a copy or a 
product exhausts the IP rights in the protecting country but only when the sale occurs in 
the protecting country. 
 70.  See infra Part V for further discussion of this example. 
 71.  See, e.g., Council Directive 96/9/EC, of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, arts. 7-12, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20. 
 72.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (addressing the termination of transfers and li-
censes granted by authors); URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 
1965, BGBI at 1273, arts. 32–32b, as amended Jan. 10, 2013 (Ger.); see also infra Part V for 
further discussion of this example. 
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Even when countries agree on IP policies generally, the policies can still 
play out differently in specific cases.  Because IP rights that require registra-
tion are protected only in the countries where the rights are registered (for 
example, registered trademarks) or granted (for example, patents), the rele-
vance of particular national IP policies to a particular mark or invention var-
ies based on whether the IP right is registered in the country or not.  Even 
when rights vest automatically for multiple countries, as happens in the case 
of copyright and well-known marks,73 the rights may be subject to different 
national IP policies in individual countries.  For example, countries may 
agree that cinematographic works should enjoy copyright protection,74 but 
the countries may vary in their notions of whether and how copyright should 
serve to support their own domestic film industry.75 
The implementation of the exhaustion principle in copyright law in the 
United States exemplifies U.S. legislators’ failure to identify and implement 
national IP policies for the transnational context.  Court decisions concern-
ing the exhaustion rule in cross-border copyright cases, such as Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.,76 Omega S.A. v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp.,77 and Kirtsaeng,78 show courts struggling to locate any sign in 
the legislation or the legislative history of Congress’ consideration of cross-
border scenarios and implementation of national IP policies in the transna-
tional context.  The legislators’ silence in this instance is not unique; so far, 
legislators in only some countries have paid attention to designing IP rules 
for cross-border scenarios and to reflecting IP policies in conflict of laws 
rules. 
III.  A COUNTRY’S FLEXIBILITY IN DESIGNING ITS CONFLICT OF LAWS 
RULES 
If conflict of laws rules are to serve to implement national IP policies, 
the rules must be sufficiently flexible to allow countries to fine-tune the rules 
according to the needs of the countries’ policies.  Rigid rules would affect 
the implementation of national policies and not allow countries to shape the 
rules to accomplish policy goals.  As this Part explains, conflict of laws rules 
are not rigid but are subject to various factors that constrain their design and 
application.  This Part reviews these constraints and argues that despite the 
limitations caused by the constraints, countries maintain some degree of flex-
ibility when designing and applying conflict of laws rules. 
                                                        
 73.  See infra note 109. 
 74.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2(1). 
 75.  See infra Part VI for further discussion of this example. 
 76.  523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
 77.  541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
 78.  133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
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There are four sources of limitations on countries’ discretion to formu-
late their national conflict of laws rules.79  First, international treaty obliga-
tions may dictate that countries adopt certain rules; this source also includes 
bilateral treaties and regional instruments that may limit or direct countries’ 
choices in setting their conflict of laws rules.  Second, comity, which is not 
formulated in international treaties but is an internationally recognized 
principle, impacts how countries design and apply their conflict of laws rules.  
Third, inter-country cooperation (for example, in the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments) is a source of limitations on the operation 
of a country’s conflict of laws rules, which are confined de facto by other 
countries’ willingness to accept a country’s territorial ambitions, whether 
those ambitions are expressed in conflict of laws rules or in any other of a 
variety of norms.  Finally, higher laws in a country’s national hierarchy of 
laws may limit a country’s discretion in formulating its national conflict of 
laws rules; for example, conflict of laws rules are typically subject to national 
constitutional principles. 
A.  International Treaties and Regional Instruments on Conflict of Laws 
At the international level no large-scale conflict of laws treaty yet exists; 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law failed to produce a trea-
ty on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
that would apply generally to civil and commercial matters.80  The Hague 
Conference’s work in the 1990s and early 2000s resulted in a limited Conven-
tion on Choice of Court Agreements, which has not yet entered into force.81  
If the reopened Hague Conference’s Judgments Project82 bears fruit in the 
form of a large-scale treaty, the treaty will limit countries’ flexibility in design-
ing their national rules on jurisdiction and in the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments. 
At the regional level, the flexibility of some countries in the conflict of 
laws area has already been curtailed to some extent.  The European Union 
(“EU”) (and through the extension of its legislation, the larger European 
Economic Area) has rules for jurisdiction of national courts, choice of law, 
and the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments from other EU 
                                                        
 79.  On sources of limitations on countries’ discretion to formulate their national con-
flict of laws rules see, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, supra note 57, at 27–42.  
 80.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 81.  Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited Sept. 26, 
2014).  The Convention applies only to business-to-business agreements, and excludes IP 
matters to a certain extent from the Convention’s scope.  For a discussion of the Conven-
tion’s applicability to IP matters, see Stefan Luginbuehl & Heike Wollgast, IP Rights in the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JOCHEN PAGENBERG 
(Dietrich Beier, et al. eds., 2006) 321–49. 
 82.  See supra note 14. 
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member states.83  Within the scope of these instruments, EU member states 
are not free to adopt whatever conflict of laws rules they may desire; they 
must follow the rules in the EU instruments, which are directly applicable 
under EU law.84 
Although no large-scale international treaty binds all countries—or 
even a majority of them—in the conflict of laws area, there is one interna-
tionally recognized principle that should guide all countries in designing 
and applying rules of conflict of laws: the principle of comity.85  The U.S. Su-
preme Court in Hilton v. Guyot86 defined the “comity of nations” as “the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”87  In its operation, “the 
principle of comity promotes the notion that [when appropriate] a court will 
[apply foreign law and] enforce a foreign court’s decision today with the ex-
pectation that the foreign court will reciprocate when the situation reverses 
in the future.”88  Each country’s legislators and courts assess the appropri-
ateness of the reflection of comity in their own particular provisions and de-
cisions based on a consideration of other countries’ practices and their own 
expectations as to what the practices ought to be.89  Although comity places 
limits on countries’ leeway in the conflict of laws area, the principle is flexi-
                                                        
 83.  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, revised in Convention on Jurisdic-
tion and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, Oct. 30, 2007, 2009 O.J. (L 147) 5 [hereinafter Lugano II Convention]; Council Reg-
ulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December, 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 35, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 
[hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]; Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 No-
vember 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1; 
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 [here-
inafter Rome II Regulation]; Brussels Convention, supra note 22; Rome I Regulation, supra 
note 61; Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22. 
 84.  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 171, art. 
288. 
 85.  For a historical overview of the understanding of “comity” in the United States and 
a criticism of the current concept of “comity” see Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Con-
flict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2011). 
 86.  159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 87.  Id. at 164. 
 88.  MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
165 (2012).  Notwithstanding this expectation, which is inherent in the operation of the 
comity principle, comity is not necessarily linked to the principle of reciprocity. 
 89.  Justice Story explained that “[e]very nation must be the final judge for itself, not 
only of the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its exercise may be 
justly demanded.”  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 32 (1841). 
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ble, and countries interpret it to allow space for implementation of their na-
tional policies. 
B.  Other International Treaties and Regional Instruments 
In addition to international law and principles specific to the conflict of 
laws area that impact the design of national conflict of laws rules, interna-
tional treaties and principles arising in other areas of law may also mandate 
how conflict of laws rules must be designed and applied.  For example, Arti-
cle 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affects conflict of laws 
rules because it requires countries to ensure “effective remedy by the compe-
tent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights.”90  These re-
quirements have implications for national rules of jurisdiction and choice of 
law, and may specifically affect the rules with respect to IP because Article 17 
of the Declaration concerns property, presumably including IP.91 
International IP treaties, which are another example of treaties that in-
fluence the design of conflict of laws rules, include very few conflict of laws 
rules per se.92  For example, Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is some-
times cited as the key choice of law rule in international copyright;93 accord-
ing to the provision “the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress 
afforded to the author to protect his rights [under copyright], shall be gov-
erned exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.”94  
Some commentators argue that the provision calls for the application of a 
particular choice of law rule (the law of the protecting country or the law of 
the forum), at least for copyright infringements,95 while others view Article 
5(2) not as a choice of law provision but as “essentially no more than a rule 
barring discrimination against foreign right holders, which requires a coun-
                                                        
 90.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec 10, 1948). 
 91.  Id. at art. 17.  For a discussion of human rights documents’ coverage of IP by pro-
visions on property see Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual Property, Nationality, and Non-
Discrimination, a Document Prepared for the Panel Discussion to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Oct. 20, 1998), 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=7609; Christophe Geiger, Intel-
lectual “Property” after the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Different Approach in the New European Le-
gal Order?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 255 (2010); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human 
Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007). 
 92.  2 SAM RICKETSON, JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND §§ 20.17–20.28, at 1292 (2d 
ed. 2005) (“[D]eriving from the Berne text supranational choice of law rules is a delicate, 
if not improbable, operation.”).  Graeme Dinwoodie refers to this source as “public private 
international intellectual property law.”  Dinwoodie, supra note 2. 
 93.  Berne Convention, supra note 66. 
 94.  Id. at art. 5(2). 
 95.  See, e.g., RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 92, § 20.08, at 1297–98.  Cf. William 
Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 409 (2000) (“Berne 
has no general choice of law directive on ownership . . . .”). 
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try to apply the same law to works of foreign origin as it applies to works of its 
own nationals.”96 
While it has been debated whether or not Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention is a choice of law provision, the meaning of Article 14bis(2)(a) of 
the Berne Convention for the choice of applicable law appears to be une-
quivocal; according to the provision, copyright ownership in cinematograph-
ic works “shall be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is 
claimed.”97  In the case of this rule, as in the case of Article 5(2), it remains 
an open question whether it is a rule leading directly to the choice of appli-
cable law, or whether the rule allows for the application of renvoi98 and there-
fore allows courts in “the country where protection is claimed” to apply their 
jurisdiction’s choice of law rules to determine applicable law based on those 
rules.99  While the first interpretation would mean that the Berne Conven-
tion would dictate a particular choice of law rule that countries have to 
adopt, the second interpretation would give countries freedom to design 
their own choice of law rule. 
Regional IP instruments that are directly applicable in countries in a 
region100 typically contain conflict of laws provisions that address various ver-
                                                        
 96.  E.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: 
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 129 (2010).  For a discussion of the debate about the 
proper interpretation of the national treatment provision in Berne, see STRÖMHOLM, supra 
note 2, at 21 (“[I]t cannot be denied that both the mention of the law of the country 
where protection is claimed and the prohibition of discrimination in Art. 5 do imply a ref-
erence in principle to a certain legal system—a reference which comes close, both in form 
and in function, to the rules of private international law.”); see also Robert Brauneis, Na-
tional Treatment in Copyright and Related Rights: How Much Work Does It Do? 27 (GW Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2013-103, 2013), available at 
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/810/?utm_source=scholarship.law.g
wu.edu%2Ffaculty_publications%2F810&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverP
ages.  For similar provisions to Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, see WIPO Perfor-
mances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 5(3), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 105-17 (1997), 
2186 U.N.T.S. 203; Beijing Treaty of Audiovisual Performances in Beijing, art. 5(3), June 
24, 2012, AVP/DC/20, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/avp_dc_20.pdf (not yet in 
force as of Sept. 28, 2014) (providing for the law of the country “where protection is 
claimed” as the law applicable to “[t]he means of redress” for violating the moral rights of 
authors and performers); Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 6bis(3).  Additionally, 
Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention provides that “[p]rotection in the country of origin 
is governed by domestic law.”  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5(3). 
 97.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 14bis(2)(a). 
 98.  Renvoi means “refer back or refer away” and it “occurs when the forum applies a 
foreign choice-of-law rule that selects law different from that chosen by the forum’s rule.”  
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 103 (6th ed. 2010). 
 99.  On renvoi and the Berne Convention see Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 322. 
 100.  See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (The European patent is often 
described as a bundle of national patents.); Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 De-
cember 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 (in effect since 1994, cod-
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tical conflicts that may arise in a single territory between the regional law 
that the instruments create and coexisting national laws; however, the in-
struments also include rules for horizontal conflicts between the regional law 
and national laws of countries outside the region, and conflicts among the 
national laws of countries within the region to the extent that the national 
laws are applicable within the regime of the regional IP instruments.  For ex-
ample, Article 60(1) of the European Patent Convention includes a rule for 
choosing the national law that will determine the right to a European pa-
tent,101 and Article 64(3) addresses choice of law for infringements.102  Simi-
larly, regulations establishing unitary EU-wide rights—the EU Trademark 
Regulation103 and the EU Design Regulation104—contain rules for “jurisdic-
tion and procedure in legal actions relating” to the unitary rights105 and for 
the choice of applicable law.106 
In addition to the few conflict of laws rules per se that are included in 
international IP treaties and regional instruments on IP, the treaties and in-
struments include other provisions that are not conflict of laws rules per se 
but that affect the design and operation of conflict of laws rules.  The princi-
ple of territoriality of IP rights,107 which permeates IP laws at all levels, influ-
ences the design and application of conflict of laws rules.  The principle of 
territoriality means that IP rights exist only under a single country’s law and 
the protection of the rights under the law extends only to places where the 
law reaches.  The principle is clearly apparent, for example, in provisions 
concerning the independence of individual national patents and trademarks 
on patents granted and trademarks registered in other countries.108  Even in 
                                                        
ified in Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community 
Trade Mark, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1) [hereinafter EU Trademark Regulation]; Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (in 
effect since 2002) [hereinafter EU Designs Regulation]. 
 101.  European Patent Convention, supra note 100, art. 60(1).  The rule is accompanied 
by the Protocol on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Decisions in Respect of the Right to 
the Grant of a European Patent, October 5, 1973, available at http://www.epo.org/law-
practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/ma4.html. 
 102.  European Patent Convention, supra note 100, art. 64(3).  The rule calls for the 
application of “national law” to “[a]ny infringement of a European patent.”  Id. 
 103.  EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100. 
 104.  EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100. 
 105.  EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100, at Title X; EU Designs Regulation, su-
pra note 100, at Title IX.  Disputes concerning these rights are adjudicated by special 
courts established by individual EU member countries.  EU Trademark Regulation, supra 
note 100, at art. 95; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100, at art. 80. 
 106.  EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100, at arts. 98 and 101.1; EU Designs Regu-
lation, supra note 100, at arts. 83 and 88.1.  The national courts apply the substantive law of 
the regulations, and for matters not covered by the regulations, national courts “apply 
[their] national law, including [their] private international law.”  EU Trademark Regula-
tion, supra note 100, at art. 101.2; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100, at art. 88.2. 
 107.  See supra Part III. 
 108.  Paris Convention, supra note 66, at arts. 4bis(1) and 6(3). 
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cases of rights that enjoy recognition in multiple countries because of inter-
national treaties (such as literary and artistic works under the Berne Conven-
tion, and well-known marks under the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement),109 the rights exist on a country-by-country basis with national 
differences attached to the rights in national legislation (for example, rules 
of protectable subject matter in copyright and rules for when a mark is con-
sidered well-known in the country of enforcement).  It is an extension of the 
territoriality principle that countries typically select the rule of lex loci protec-
tionis (the law of the protecting country) or lex loci delicti (the law of the place 
of tort) for the choice of law applicable to infringements of IP rights. 
Conflict of laws rules are also affected by the principle of national 
treatment110 and the most-favored-nation principle.111  The principle of na-
tional treatment is the defining feature of IP treaties, which were initially ne-
gotiated to overcome the protectionism of countries that led some of them 
to protect the IP of only their own nationals.112  The principle of national 
treatment requires that countries treat foreigners (those who enjoy protec-
tion of their IP under the treaties because of a connecting factor)113 in the 
same manner as or no worse than the countries treat their own nationals.114  
The most-favored-nation principle was imported into IP from trade treaties; 
the principle requires that all foreigners be treated equal to whichever for-
eigners are receiving the best treatment.115  For conflict of laws rules the 
principles mean that, as among litigants whose IP is protected under a treaty 
because of a connecting factor, national conflict of laws rules in IP disputes 
are not permitted to distinguish among litigants based on their nationalities 
                                                        
 109.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at arts. 2(6); Paris Convention, supra note 66, at 
art. 6bis; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 16(2). 
 110.  Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2; Berne Convention, supra note 66, at arts. 
5(1) and 5(3); Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971, art. II, 
25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178; International Convention for the Protection of Per-
formers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, arts. 4–6, Oct. 26, 
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 3; North American Free 
Trade Agreement, art. 1703, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 4.  See also GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra 
note 96, at 99–112. 
 111.  TRIPS, supra note 66, at art. 4; see also GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 96, 
at 112–14. 
 112.  See, e.g., CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH JAEGER, UEBER ERFINDUNGS-PATENTE 35 (1840); 
FELIX DAMME, DAS DEUTSCHE PATENTRECHT 26 (1906); RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT 296 (1840).  Some 
countries even discriminated against their own nationals if the nationals opted for protec-
tion of their IP in another country. 
 113.  “Foreigners” may include persons domiciled in other countries—parties to the 
Convention.  See Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 3. 
 114.  See, e.g., Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2(1); Berne Convention, supra 
note at, at art. 5(1).  For an analysis of the current limited role of the principle of national 
treatment in intellectual property treaties see Brauneis, supra note 96. 
 115.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 4. 
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if a different treatment of litigants would lead to the violation of the princi-
ples.116 
International treaties and regional instruments that require countries to 
provide for remedies for infringements of IP rights also influence conflict of 
laws rules; the provisions can be interpreted to mandate the adoption of spe-
cific solutions for jurisdiction and choice of law.117  For example, Article 8 of 
the EU Information Society Directive instructs EU member countries to 
“provide appropriate sanctions and remedies in respect of infringements of 
the rights and obligations set out in [the] Directive,”118 and each member 
country must “take the measures necessary to ensure that rightholders whose 
interests are affected by an infringing activity carried out in [the member 
state’s] territory can bring an action for damages and/or apply for an injunc-
tion and . . . seizure.”119  This language of the Directive suggests that an EU 
member country must provide for the jurisdiction of its courts based on the 
place of the tortious activity, and that the law of the country must apply to 
“an infringing activity carried out in [the country’s] territory.”120 
                                                        
 116.  Of course countries may be bound by other international obligations that also 
prevent the countries from distinguishing among litigants; in particular, human rights 
treaties may prohibit discrimination in general.  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, supra note 90, at art. 7; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra 
note 84, at art. 18; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 21, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 13. 
 117.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 16; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at 
art. 41.1; North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 110, at art. 1714–1718; WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, infra note 169, at art. 14; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
supra note 96, at art. 23. 
 118.  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the In-
formation Society, art. 8.1, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10. 
 119.  Id. at art. 8.2. 
 120.  Id.  Provisions of the EU IPR Enforcement Directive could be interpreted similarly 
except that one of the Directive’s recitals explicitly states that the Directive “does not aim 
to establish harmonised rules for judicial cooperation, jurisdiction, the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial matters, or deal with applicable law.”  
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Preamble, Recital 11, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 
16 [hereinafter EU IPR Enforcement Directive].  However, the language of the recital 
does not mean that the Directive has no influence on national conflict of laws rules; ra-
ther, the recital evidences the concern of EU drafters about a potential dispute over the 
legal basis for the Directive and the required type of legislative procedure, which led the 
drafters to emphasize the IP-centered focus of the directive (the legal basis and the legisla-
tive procedure were different at the time for IP legislation and for legislation concerning 
judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters). 
It is important to recall that the EU IPR Enforcement Directive was adopted at a time 
when an ongoing dispute existed between the European Commission and the Council 
about EU competences in certain criminal law matters.  The dispute was settled by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, 2005 
E.C.R. 7879.  The dispute affected the negotiations of the EU IPR Enforcement Directive.  
On clashes of “[t]raditional private international law and EU law” see generally, Ralf 
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C.  National Laws and Policies Limiting Conflict of Laws Rules 
The reactions of other countries in actual cases are evidence of the tan-
gible guidelines that exist for a country’s conflict of laws rules because assis-
tance from other countries is often necessary for the proper functioning of 
the rules.121  Assistance is not limited to the recognition and enforcement of 
a judgment; the country will also need other countries to assist in matters 
such as service of process and the securing of evidence.  Failure to obtain as-
sistance from other countries does not necessarily mean that the country 
must amend its conflict of laws rules to make the rules acceptable to other 
countries or better reflect practices in those countries; however, the actions 
of other countries will influence the country’s evaluation of its law, including 
its conflict of laws rules, with the result that the law or conflict of laws rules 
might be judged as ill-conceived if the rules consistently result in unenforce-
able decisions.  Therefore, countries’ levels of acceptance of each other’s 
conflict of laws rules influence, and to a certain degree dictate, the design of 
national conflict of laws rules. 
Examples, including examples from the area of IP, exist where reac-
tions to countries’ conflict of laws rules suggested that the rules were not ac-
ceptable to other countries.  For example, in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth,122 
the U.K. Supreme Court explained that there are limits to the grounds of ju-
risdiction of U.S. courts that U.K. courts will view as acceptable when U.K. 
courts decide whether to recognize and enforce judgments issued by U.S. 
courts.123  In Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Abdullah Ali Bahattab,124 reacting to an 
ongoing foreign court proceeding concerning a U.S. patent, a U.S. court 
warned that it would ignore any foreign decision concerning the validity of a 
U.S. patent, thus rejecting a foreign court’s jurisdiction to decide the validity 
                                                        
Michaels, EU Law as Private International Law? Re-conceptualizing the Country-of-Origin Principle 
as Vested Rights Theory, (Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 122, 2006), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2280&context=faculty_schol
arship. 
 121.  As illustrated in Part I, a country can successfully enforce its laws without assistance 
from other countries only if the country has enforcement power over the defendant or a 
related third party; as long as the defendant and/or his assets (or the third party and/or 
his assets) are located in the country, the country’s court decisions can be enforced direct-
ly against the defendant or against the third party.  See Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 1217.  
Of course, a country may be successful in seeing its laws respected by a defendant voluntar-
ily; for a discussion of examples of reasons for a defendant’s voluntary compliance, see, 
e.g., Marketa Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Patent Cases and Their Enforcement 
Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331, 345–46 (2009). 
 122.  Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also 
supra note 47 (describing scenario 5). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Abdullah Ali Bahattab, No. 07–1771, slip op. (D.D.C. 
Aug. 14, 2009). 
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of a U.S. patent.125  To what extent these types of reactions will affect a for-
eign country’s decisions on its own conflict of laws rules will depend on vari-
ous factors, including the political and economic strength of the country and 
the country’s relations with the countries from which the reactions originate. 
Finally, national laws that are higher in the hierarchy of laws than con-
flict of laws rules, including national constitutions and constitutional princi-
ples, may limit conflict of laws rules. National constitutions typically contain 
guidelines for rules of civil procedure, including rules for conflict of laws.126  
For example, in the United States, the federal Constitution includes three 
provisions that have been found to impact conflict of laws rules directly: the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV (for state-to-state conflicts within 
the United States),127 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,128 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.129  
In other countries, interpretations of constitutional provisions impose similar 
limitations on conflict of laws rules. 
As demonstrated in this Part, countries are confined in their formula-
tions and applications of conflict of laws rules; however, the confines are of-
ten very general and still provide leeway for countries to adjust their conflict 
of laws rules according to national policies, including IP policies.130  To the 
extent that countries are not bound by existing international and regional 
instruments, the countries are also free to adopt conflict of laws rules that 
are specific to certain areas of law or types of activities, including IP law, IP 
licenses, and IP infringements.  However, the delineation of the effective ter-
ritorial scope of IP laws does not stand on conflict of laws rules alone; the de-
lineation depends also on the design of the territorial scope of IP laws.131 
IV.  A COUNTRY’S FLEXIBILITY IN DESIGNING ITS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAWS 
Countries are limited in their exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction by 
customary international law, which permits the exercise of prescriptive juris-
diction based on five internationally accepted grounds—“territoriality, na-
                                                        
 125.  Id. 
 126.  On the interaction of constitutional law and conflict of laws rules see, e.g., Ayelet 
Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! v. L.C.R.A.: Private Law, Constitutional 
Review, and International Conflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2004). 
 127.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 98, at 691–716. 
 128.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 98, at 655–90. 
 129.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,  § 1; see also, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 98, at 716–21. 
 130.  See supra Part II for a discussion of how conflict of laws rules are designed to im-
plement national policies, including substantive policies, such as IP policies. 
 131.  See supra Part I. 
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tionality, the protective principle, passive personality, and universality.”132  At 
least one of these five grounds must be present for a country to exercise pre-
scriptive jurisdiction in the area of intellectual property law.  However, the 
grounds can be interpreted broadly133 and there is usually nothing to pre-
vent countries from exceeding the general limitations on prescriptive juris-
diction that these grounds mandate.134 
Notwithstanding the vagueness of general limitations on prescriptive ju-
risdiction, other limitations on countries’ designs of the territorial scope of 
their substantive IP laws exist, and these limitations emanate from the same 
types of sources as the constraints on conflict of laws rules: international and 
bilateral treaties, regional instruments, internationally recognized principles, 
and laws that stand higher in a country’s hierarchy of laws than do IP laws.  
Additionally, other countries’ IP laws may also affect the design of national 
IP laws.  Of course, other factors can influence decisions about national IP 
legislation.  Arguments for particular choices in IP legislation arise from po-
litical, social, cultural, historical, and economic rationales, and policymakers 
may contend that the arguments mandate certain legislative choices; for ex-
ample, they may argue that an economic analysis suggests only one reasona-
ble legislative solution to a problem.  This Part leaves aside these other fac-
tors that may be perceived as limitations and focuses on factors that delineate 
the fixed outer boundaries of national IP legislation.135 
                                                        
 132.  CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 184 (2013); see 
also Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie, New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to 
Jurisdiction, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1017, 1025–28 (2011). 
 133.  BRADLEY, supra note 132, at 186 (“Although effects-based jurisdiction is generally 
accepted, its proper scope is unclear.”). 
 134.  Id. at 185; see infra note 177 and accompanying text for more on constitutional 
limits that countries have in their national constitutions; see supra Part III for a discussion 
of comity; see also, infra, notes 177–179 and accompanying text for a discussion of foreign 
countries’ reactions in particular cases to the intended extraterritorial effects of IP laws. 
 135.  Naturally, drawing a line between fixed outer boundaries and other factors is diffi-
cult; a conclusion in an economic analysis may be no less objective and unequivocal than a 
mandatory minimum standard in an international treaty, and the same political, social, 
cultural, historical, and economic rationales that affect national legislation may also play a 
role in international treaty negotiations.  The assumption is that legislators can ignore the 
other factors, but they are bound by the fixed outer limit factors even though legislators 
may and occasionally do choose to ignore international treaty obligations, just as they may 
decide to ignore a conclusion in an economic analysis when they make national law.  This 
Part focuses on the outer limits of the design of IP laws, which are presented here as limi-
tations that national legislators should respect; the limits are relatively fixed and are very 
difficult to change. 
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A.  The National Treatment Principle, the Most-Favored-Nation 
Principle, and the Territoriality Principle 
The principle of national treatment and the most-favored-nation prin-
ciple,136 on which international treaties concerning IP are built, affect the 
design of national legislation, including the design of the legislation’s terri-
torial reach.  As long as a connecting factor exists to the treaties that include 
the principles, national laws must provide certain rights and remedies to for-
eigners and thus have a territorial reach to wherever the foreigners may be.  
For example, the first publication of a photograph in a Berne Convention 
country, such as Germany, will result in the photograph’s being protected 
under the Berne Convention even if its author is not a national of a Berne 
Convention country, such as a national of Afghanistan (a country that is not 
a party to the Berne Convention).137  Because of the principle of national 
treatment, Germany must provide to the Afghan photographer at least the 
same rights with regard to the photograph as it would to a German photog-
rapher.138  As a result, German copyright law must be designed to provide 
the reproduction right with regard to the photograph,139 even if the right 
benefits an author who is an Afghan national who resides outside of Germa-
ny.  Naturally, the right protected by German law will concern only acts of 
reproduction that are protected by German law; this protection is consistent 
with the territoriality principle, another internationally recognized principle 
that affects the territorial reach of national IP laws. 
It would seem that the principle of territoriality140 should have the 
greatest effect on the territorial reach of national IP laws; the principle 
sounds as if it should prevent any extraterritorial reach of national IP legisla-
tion.  In fact, though, the principle requires only that a country limit its legis-
lating within the scope of the country’s own prescriptive jurisdiction; as sug-
gested earlier in Part I and discussed later in this Part, the country’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction can nevertheless extend de facto beyond the physical 
borders of the country.141 
B.  Minimum Standards 
In addition to the national treatment, most-favored-nation, and territo-
riality principles, international treaties (and also bilateral treaties and re-
gional instruments) provide for minimum standards that countries must 
                                                        
 136.  See supra Part III.B. for an explanation of the two principles. 
 137.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 3(1)(b). 
 138.  Id. at arts. 5(1) and 5(3). 
 139.  Id. at art. 9(1) (defining the right of reproduction as “the exclusive right of au-
thorizing the reproduction of [literary and artistic] works”). 
 140.  See supra Part III.B. for an explanation of the principle of territoriality. 
 141.  GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 96, at 95. 
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meet in their IP legislation.142  The degree to which minimum standards 
provisions set limits on national legislation varies.  Some provisions, such as 
provisions concerning the term of copyright,143 are unequivocal and coun-
tries may not deviate from the standard except to increase the term of pro-
tection above the minimum.  In some countries, provisions of this nature in 
international treaties are considered directly applicable (self-executing), 
meaning that they automatically become integral parts of the national legal 
order and national courts can apply them even without corresponding na-
tional implementing legislation.144 
Some minimum standard provisions provide for a goal that must be 
achieved but leave it upon national legislation to implement measures that 
will achieve the goal.  For example, Article 16 of the Berne Convention 
mandates that countries provide for the seizure of infringing copies but 
leaves it upon national legislation to set the rules for seizures.145  The con-
cept of goal-setting provisions also exists in regional instruments: EU direc-
tives set goals for national legislation to achieve.146  In goal-setting provisions, 
freedom to select the mode of implementation allows a certain flexibility for 
countries as they adopt laws to comply with minimum standards. 
Additional leeway for national lawmaking exists because some mini-
mum standards provisions are flexible.  For example, some provisions are op-
tional,147 while other provisions allow for exceptions from minimum stand-
ards under certain conditions.148  In some instances countries may deposit 
notifications, reservations, and declarations in which they declare their in-
                                                        
 142.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 1(3) for information on explicit man-
datory minimum standards. 
 143.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 7; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 
12. 
 144.  See, e.g., Merck Genericos v. Merck & Co. and Merck, Sharp, & Dohme, (2007) 
41(5) IIC 614, 616 (2010) (Port.) (“Art. 33 TRIPS is precise and unconditional, prerequi-
sites for its direct application.”); see also infra note 146 (noting that in the EU, the direct 
applicability of EU instruments corresponds to the concept of self-executing treaty provi-
sions).  Cf. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) (“TRIPs is plainly 
not a self-executing treaty.”). 
 145.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 16(3). 
 146.  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 84, at art. 288.  In 
the EU, directives are used to harmonize national IP laws; regulations set EU-wide law for 
EU unitary rights—the Community trademark and the Community design, for example.  
See EU Trademark Regulation, supra note 100; EU Designs Regulation, supra note 100.  
Some EU law provisions may be directly applicable even if they are included in EU instru-
ments other than regulations. 
 147.  For example, Article 2(4) of the Berne Convention leaves it upon national 
legislation to specify the copyright protection of “official texts of a legislative, 
administrative and legal nature.”  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 2(4). 
 148.  For example, Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement excepts countries from the 
obligation to provide for the rental right in cases of cinematographic works “unless such 
rental has led to widespread copying of such works which is materially impairing the 
exclusive right of reproduction.”  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 11. 
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tent to divert from certain treaty provisions.149  Also, international treaties 
may allow flexibilities to countries for which implementation of minimum 
standards provisions presents particular hardships.150 
Flexibility in interpretation is also important for countries’ options in 
national IP lawmaking, whether the flexibility is actually intended by treaty 
negotiators or not.  An example of an intended interpretative flexibility is 
the flexibility that allows countries to define their rule of exhaustion; Article 
6 of the TRIPS Agreement, which acknowledges countries’ disagreement on 
the issue, leaves it upon each country to decide for itself whether it wishes to 
adopt the principle of national exhaustion or the principle of international 
exhaustion.151  Other instances of flexibility in interpretation may not have 
been anticipated or planned, or sometimes even desired by international 
treaty negotiators, but flexibility exists either because there is no effective 
dispute resolution mechanism to lead to unity in interpretation, or because 
countries tolerate the interpretative flexibility in a given case.152 
Notwithstanding the flexibilities mentioned in the previous paragraphs, 
minimum standards provisions in international treaties do provide certain 
limits to national lawmaking, including some limits on the territorial reach of 
national IP laws.  However, the provisions’ main objective is to secure mini-
                                                        
 149.  See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 66, at arts. 13(1) and 14bis(3); WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 96, at art. 15(3); TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 66, at arts. 3(2) and 14(6).  But cf. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, su-
pra note 96, at art. 21.  This Part leaves aside instances in which “flexibility” results from 
countries not meeting their international obligations.  Some countries may feel free to ig-
nore provisions of international treaties, particularly if the international enforceability of 
the provisions is limited.  For example, Article 6bis of the Berne Convention is specifically 
excluded from being incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9(1) of the TRIPS 
agreement.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 6bis; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
66, at art. 9(1).  
 150.  The 1971 Appendix to the Berne Convention containing Special Provisions Re-
garding Developing Countries, and Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement delaying imple-
mentation requirements in the least-developed countries are examples of such arrange-
ments.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, app.; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 66. 
 151.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66, at art. 6; see supra notes 68 and 69 for the princi-
ples of international and national exhaustion  Once the IP right is exhausted, the right 
holder cannot control the disposition of the product any further (at least not based on the 
right holder’s IP rights).  The exhaustion principle is known in U.S. law as the first sale 
doctrine.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).  Regional instruments may limit countries’ 
abilities to choose.  For example, under EU law, EU countries must adhere to the principle 
of EU-wide exhaustion for IP rights.  First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to Ap-
proximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 89/104, art. 7, 1988 
O.J. 1, 6 (EC).  
 152.  For example, the prohibition against formalities in Article 5(2) of the Berne Con-
vention has been interpreted in the United States as not affecting certain formality re-
quirements maintained by the U.S. Copyright Act even after the United States became a 
party to the Berne Convention.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5(2).  Although 
some countries may disagree with the interpretation adopted by the United States, they 
may decide not to object to the U.S. interpretation. 
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mum standards in the territory of each country, and only isolated provisions 
address a national law’s intended territorial reach.  For example, Article 
5quater of the Paris Convention calls for a certain extraterritorial reach of na-
tional patent law; it instructs countries to grant rights to a patentee with re-
gard to an imported product that was manufactured abroad by a process that 
is protected in the importing country.153  Contrary to this call for extraterri-
torial reach in national patent laws, Article 5ter of the Paris Convention limits 
the territorial reach of national patent laws within the borders of each coun-
try when it excludes from the infringement of national patent rights the use 
of certain patented products on vessels, aircraft, and land vehicles that are 
temporarily present in the country.154 
C.  Localization 
Some minimum standard provisions allow countries significant leeway 
in delineating the territorial reach of their national IP laws because the pro-
visions do not address the localization of operative facts.155  For example, Ar-
ticle 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement includes “offering to sell” among the ac-
tivities that a patent owner has the exclusive right to prevent, but the 
provision does not specify whether both the offer and the sale, or only one or 
the other, must occur in the country where the patent was granted.156  As a 
result, countries differ in their territorial delineation of infringing “offers to 
sell” a patented invention.  For example, under German law any offer made 
in Germany—but not outside Germany—to sell a patented product infringes 
the German patent, whether the sale is intended to occur inside or outside of 
Germany.157  In the United States, however, at least under the current inter-
pretation adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, an 
offer made anywhere in the world—even outside the United States—
infringes the U.S. patent, but the intended sale must occur inside the United 
States.158  Even when an international treaty provision seems unambiguous 
about where a patent infringing act must occur, countries may differ in their 
approaches to the localization of acts and therefore to the territorial reach of 
                                                        
 153.  Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5quater.  In the United States, Section 
271(g) of the Patent Act corresponds to this provision and extends U.S. patent rights to 
cover a patented process even when the process has been run outside the United States—
as long as the products manufactured through the process are being imported into the 
United States.  35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012). 
 154.  Paris Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5ter.  In the United States, Section 272 of 
the Patent Act corresponds to this provision.  35 U.S.C. § 272 (2012). 
 155.  On differences in localization in copyright cases see, e.g., Geller, supra note 2, at 
335–36. 
 156.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 66 at art. 28(1). 
 157.  Reichsgericht, I 137/33, Jan. 13, 1934, RGZ 29, 173; Kreuzbodenventilsäcke, Bun-
desgerichtshof, I ZR 109/58, Mar. 29, 1960, 1960 GRUR 423. 
 158.  Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 
617 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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the implementing provision; for example, countries may localize the place of 
a patent infringing sale differently, such as the place of a “free on board” 
sale,159 or a sale that occurs through the internet.160 
An expansive approach to localization will contribute to a territorial ex-
pansion of national IP laws; such an expansive approach can concern the lo-
calization of all operative facts and not just the facts related to acts of in-
fringement.  The place of publication is an example.  If U.S. courts deem the 
publication of a work viewable on the internet from within the United States 
to occur in the United States regardless of where the work at issue was up-
loaded to the internet, such treatment has implications for the territorial 
reach of U.S. copyright law.161  This localization of the act of publication 
means that any work first published on the internet in a manner that allows 
for the work to be viewable in the United States162 will cause the work to have 
the United States as the country of origin under the Berne Convention.163  
Making works to be “works . . . first published in the United States”164 further 
means that the works are covered by the U.S. Copyright Act even though 
their authors are not U.S. nationals, U.S. domiciliaries, or other eligible per-
sons.165  Additionally, to the extent that some countries’ courts may apply the 
                                                        
 159.  For a definition of “free on board,” see The Incoterms® Rules (2010), 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC), http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-
services/trade-facilitation/incoterms-2010/the-incoterms-rules/ (last visited Sept. 28, 
2014) (“‘Free On Board’ means that the seller delivers the goods on board the vessel nom-
inated by the buyer at the named port of shipment or procures the goods already so deliv-
ered.  The risk of loss of or damage to the goods passes when the goods are on board the 
vessel, and the buyer bears all costs from that moment onwards.”).  
 160.  See Colangelo, supra note 26, at 118 for a discussion of using localization to do-
mesticate acts and on “differing conceptualizations of the geographic coverage of U.S. 
law.”  “[B]y localizing the cross-border crime to the aspect that touches U.S. territory, the 
United States purports to exercise territorial jurisdiction.”  Id. 
 161.  See, e.g., Kernal Records OY v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (hold-
ing that the publication of an American company-owned song on the internet in Australia 
constituted simultaneous publication in the United States, and was therefore subject to 
U.S. copyright laws); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition of Publication 
in Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1747–50 (2008).  Cf. Rogers v. The Better Business 
Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2012) 
(“[U]ploading webpages to the internet does not constitute publication as a matter of 
copyright law . . . .”).  But cf. Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D. Del. 2009) (hold-
ing that the publication of photographs on the internet in Germany did not constitute 
simultaneous publication in the United States).   
 162.  The accessibility of a work on the internet from a particular territory can be lim-
ited through the use of geolocation tools.  See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cyber-
travel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 567, 586–99 (2012). 
 163.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 5(4)(a). 
 164.  17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(2) (2012). 
 165.  Id. § 104(b)(1) (making works published by “a national or domiciliary of the Unit-
ed States, or . . . a national, domiciliary, or sovereign authority of a treaty party, or is a 
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law of the country of origin when determining copyright ownership166 (and 
to the extent that these courts would agree with U.S. courts’ localization of 
the place of publication), the approach expands the application of U.S. law 
to issues of copyright ownership even beyond U.S. borders.167 
D.  Secondary Liability 
International treaties do not address matters of secondary liability for IP 
infringement, a type of liability that typically results in the extraterritorial 
reach of national IP laws.168  Nevertheless, some provisions in international 
treaties could arguably be interpreted as providing for rules of secondary lia-
bility.  For example, Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention, which provides 
for the “exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of . . . works,” could 
be interpreted as covering either an act of direct infringement in the form of 
authorizing (within the protecting country) an act of reproduction (that may 
occur anywhere), or an act of secondary infringement that appears in the 
form of authorizing (anywhere) an act of reproduction that should occur 
within the protecting country.169 
The latter possible interpretation of Article 9(1) of the Berne Conven-
tion coincides with the approach that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit adopted in Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.;170 
the court noted that when Congress included the act of authorization in the 
U.S. Copyright Act (to comply with the requirements of the Berne Conven-
tion), Congress “intended to invoke the preexisting doctrine of contributory 
infringement.”171  This interpretation limited the extraterritorial reach of the 
“authorization” provision; viewing the “authorization” provision as an out-
growth of the doctrine of contributory infringement means that an “authori-
                                                        
stateless person” subject to U.S. copyright laws).  The interpretation also has implications 
for the formalities required under the U.S. Copyright Act. 
 166.  See, e.g., Código Civil [Portuguese Civil Code], Decreto-Lei No. 47344/66, art. 48 
(1966).  Until recently, French courts applied the law of the country of origin to deter-
mine copyright ownership; however, under a 2013 ruling of the French Supreme Court 
the law of the protecting country applies to copyright ownership matters.  Cour de Cassa-
tion [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., April 10, 2013, Bull. civ. I, No. 11-
12508 and 11-12509 (Fr.). 
 167.  Also, if other countries’ courts agree with the U.S. approach, works will enjoy 
Berne Convention protection in other Berne Convention contracting countries because 
the United States becomes the country of origin under the Berne Convention.  See also 
Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 269–71. 
 168.  See, e.g., TRIMBLE, supra note 88, at 110–16.  
 169.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 9(1); see also WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 
6(1), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); WIPO Perfor-
mances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 96, at arts. 7, 11.  Alternatively, the provision 
could be interpreted as requiring that both the act of authorization and the act of repro-
duction be committed in the same protecting country. 
 170.  24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 171.  Id. at 1092. 
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zation” is only infringing when the authorized acts would infringe the U.S. 
Copyright Act, meaning that the authorized acts would occur within the 
United States.172  An authorization that occurred in the United States but 
concerned acts that would occur abroad does not infringe the Act under this 
interpretation.173 
Notwithstanding this example of an instance in which a court interpret-
ed the Berne Convention provision as if it provided for a secondary liability 
rule, international IP treaties do not expressly include provisions on second-
ary liability, so it is left up to countries to define secondary liability, including 
its territorial reach. 
E.  National Laws and Policies Limiting IP Rules 
Countries look to each other’s national IP legislation and sometimes to 
each other’s behavior, which may affect a country’s own lawmaking.  The 
behavior of other countries in IP lawmaking may matter, for example, when 
the lawmaking concerns an issue that international treaties tie to the princi-
ple of reciprocity.  The “rule of the shorter term” in Article 7(8) of the Berne 
Convention is de facto a reciprocity provision: a country will protect a work 
for as long as the country’s own term of protection if the work’s country of 
origin provides for a term of protection of at least equal duration.174  If the 
work’s country of origin provides for a shorter term of protection, the short-
er term governs.175  Under the pressure of reciprocity, a country may be 
compelled to evaluate its shorter term of protection because works for which 
the country is the country of origin are deprived of longer terms of protec-
tion in other countries.176 
Foreign countries’ reactions in particular cases to the intended extra-
territorial effects of IP laws also inform countries about the acceptability of 
such effects.177  For example, in one case a Japanese court refused to apply 
U.S. law to acts of inducement of a U.S. patent that were committed in Ja-
pan; the court invoked the public policy exception to justify the refusal and 
                                                        
 172.  Id. at 1092–94; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 
F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (confirming that U.S. courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction over acts committed outside the United States that induce copyright infringe-
ment within the United States). 
 173.  Subafilms, Ltd., 24 F.3d at 1094. 
 174.  Berne Convention, supra note 66, at art. 7(8).  
 175.  Id.  
 176.  This may be a case for “soft-harmonization,” where a country’s legislators and 
“courts, after appraising themselves of foreign law, may adopt or be influenced by that law 
if they find it persuasive.”  Holbrook, supra note 6, at 582. 
 177.  Sometimes it is the anticipation of possible reactions by foreign countries that 
guides courts’ analyses.  E.g., Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097 (“Extraterritorial application of 
American law would be contrary to the spirit of the Berne Convention, and might offend 
other member nations by effectively displacing their law in circumstances in which previ-
ously it was assumed to govern.”). 
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stated that “[t]o order prohibition of the act of actively inducing infringe-
ment of a U.S. patent and destruction of the infringing goods located in Ja-
pan by applying the U.S. Patent Act is contrary to the meaning of [public 
policy].”178  Another expression of displeasure with extraterritorial effects of 
the U.S. Patent Act was recently included in the Amicus Brief that the Danish 
government submitted in the Transocean Offshore case; the Danish govern-
ment called the application of U.S. patent law to the conduct that occurred 
in Norway “an unwanted and unprecedented intrusion into the regulation of 
conduct within foreign sovereigns’ own territory.”179 
Finally, national laws that stand higher in the hierarchy of laws than IP 
laws set limits on national IP laws, as do regional instruments if the instru-
ments enjoy a higher position in the hierarchy of national laws.  The higher 
laws may include constitutional principles; some provisions are general, 
while some are IP-specific.  Provisions concerning property in general, such 
as Article 14 of the German Constitution, are interpreted as covering IP.180  
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.  Constitution is an example of an IP-specific 
provision; it provides for a goal and the means of pursuing the goal, which 
guides copyright and patent lawmaking in the United States.181  Article 17(2) 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union simply states 
that “[i]ntellectual property shall be protected,”182 thereby clarifying that the 
protection for property in general, which is included in Article 17(1), also 
applies to IP.  Some authors argue that the territorial reach of prescriptive 
jurisdiction in the United States is subject to due process scrutiny under the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.183 
Although countries certainly face constraints when they design national 
IP legislation, the constraints are limited and still afford a significant degree 
                                                        
 178.  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 26, 2002, 56 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ], 1551 (Fujimoto v. Neuron Co. (Card Reader)), available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=619.  See also Masato Dogauchi, Private 
International Law on Intellectual Property: A Civil Law Overview, WIPO/PIL/01/8 10–11 
(2001). 
 179.  Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark in Support of 
Petitioner, at 1, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, 
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010), August 9, 2013. 
 180.  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 
1949, BGBI. XIV (Ger.). 
 181.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 182.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, infra note 116, at art. 
17(2). 
 183.  See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 26, at 122 (“[D]ue process regulates the exercise of 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction and, at the very least, demands that the extraterri-
torial application of U.S. law not be ‘arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’”); BRADLEY, supra 
note 132, at 194–95; see also Bradley on the application of the Charming Betsy canon of 
statutory construction that should promote the application in the United States of the cus-
tomary international law on prescriptive jurisdiction, albeit only as an interpretative tool.  
BRADLEY, supra note 132, at 186. 
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of flexibility.  This flexibility is also available to national legislators when they 
delineate the territorial reach of national IP laws. 
V.  CONFLICT OF LAWS RULES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
With countries enjoying a significant degree of flexibility when design-
ing the territorial scope of national IP laws and a certain degree of flexibility 
when designing conflict of laws rules, national legislators can utilize tools 
from the two areas of law to adjust the effective territorial scope of national 
IP laws so that the effective scope reflects national IP policies.  As Part IV 
demonstrated, various possibilities remain open for countries to adjust the 
territorial scope of IP laws—flexibility in interpretation of minimum stand-
ards, flexibility in localization of operative facts, and flexibility in the setting 
of rules for secondary liability are included in the toolboxes that are available 
to national legislators.  Legislators, to the extent that they can legislate con-
flict of laws rules, should also utilize the rules to adjust the effective territori-
al scope of national IP laws;184 if legislators cannot legislate conflict of laws 
rules (for example in a case when regional instruments dictate conflict of 
laws rules) they must seek other avenues to introduce provisions in IP laws 
that will affect the application of conflict of laws rules in a manner that will 
lead to the desired outcomes.  This Part reviews IP-specific conflict of laws 
rules that emanate from legislation and case law and also identifies the alter-
natives to conflict of laws legislation that legislators can use to adjust the ef-
fective territorial scope of IP laws. 
A.  IP-Specific Conflict of Laws Legislation 
Some countries have opted to adopt IP-specific conflict of laws rules.  
Rules of jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments have all appeared with IP-specific regulation.  Rules of ju-
risdiction can include IP-specific provisions to address the problems of juris-
diction over issues of the validity of registered and granted IP rights, such as 
trademarks and patents.185  In some countries, the principle that the validity 
of foreign-registered and foreign-granted IP rights will not be entertained is 
expressed in statutes on jurisdiction.  For example, in the EU member coun-
tries a regulation on jurisdiction provides for exclusive jurisdiction “in pro-
ceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, 
                                                        
 184.  See supra Part I for a discussion of the implementation of national policies 
through conflict of laws rules. 
 185.  Generally, courts refrain from deciding the validity of foreign-registered and for-
eign-granted IP rights out of respect for the sovereignty of the foreign country that regis-
tered or granted the rights; the act of state doctrine has been invoked in the United States 
to justify U.S. courts’ refusals to decide cases in which the validity of foreign-registered and 
foreign-granted IP rights are at issue.  Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 904 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
  
2015] ADVANCING NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 245 
designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered.”186  
Jurisdiction in these proceedings is reserved to “the courts of the Member 
State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken 
place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union or an internation-
al convention deemed to have taken place.”187 
While EU rules of jurisdiction provide an example of rules concerning 
jurisdiction over the validity of registered IP rights, the Swiss Federal Act on 
International Private Law is an example of a conflict of laws statute that con-
tains a special provision on jurisdiction in cases of IP infringement.  Other 
national laws rely on general provisions for general jurisdiction based on fac-
tors such as a defendant’s domicile or a defendant’s seat, or specific jurisdic-
tion for tort cases, such as the place of the tortious activity or the tortious ac-
tivity’s effects.  Article 109(2) of the Swiss Act does not depart from this 
typical framework but stipulates specifically that in IP infringement cases the 
Swiss courts of the defendant’s domicile or usual dwelling have jurisdiction.  
Additionally, Swiss courts have jurisdiction based on the place of the tortious 
activity or the place of the effects of such activity, or based on the activities of 
the defendant’s offices if they are registered in Switzerland. 
                                                        
 186.  Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22, at art. 24, para.4. 
 187.  Id.  The interpretation of the provision’s predecessor, Article 22(4) of the Brussels 
I Regulation, supra note 83, has been the subject of numerous disputes.  See, e.g., Case C-
4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Be-
teiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-06509; Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 
E.C.R. I-06535.  The same provision also applies in the larger European Economic Area.  
Lugano II Convention, supra note 83, at art. 22(4). 
Other national conflict of laws statutes contain rules on jurisdiction specific to IP cas-
es as well.  For instance, the Japanese act concerning international jurisdiction provides for 
exclusive jurisdiction in some IP cases; according to Article 3-5(3), Japanese courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction in matters of “the existence and effect of an intellectual property 
right” that is registered in Japan.  Act for the Partial Amendment of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and the Civil Interim Relief Act, 2011, art. 3-5, para. 3 (Japan), translated in KOJI 
TAKAHASHI, JAPAN’S NEW ACT ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION (2011).  A commentary 
notes that general grounds of jurisdiction apply in actions for infringements of intellectual 
property rights.  KOJI TAKAHASHI, JAPAN’S NEW ACT ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 9 
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189684.  Other 
national statutes are more comprehensive in their IP-specific jurisdictional rules; for ex-
ample, one of the IP-specific provisions in the Swiss Federal Act on International Private 
Law provides for international exclusive jurisdiction and also details a rule for jurisdiction 
among national courts.  Article 109(1) of the Swiss Act provides for the jurisdiction of 
Swiss courts in disputes concerning the validity and registration in Switzerland of intellec-
tual property rights.  If the defendant in such a dispute is domiciled in Switzerland the 
courts in the place of domicile have jurisdiction; if the defendant is not domiciled in Swit-
zerland, then the courts in the place of domicile of the defendant’s registered Swiss repre-
sentative have jurisdiction, or, if there is no such representative, then the courts in the seat 
of the Swiss authority that registered the IP right at issue have jurisdiction.  BUNDESGESETZ 
ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG], Dec. 18, 1987, as last amended, July 1, 
2013, art. 109, para. 1 (Switz.). 
  
246 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:203 
IP-specific rules for choice of law exist, for example, in the Swiss Federal 
Act on International Private Law,188 which provides in Article 110(1) that IP 
rights are governed by the law of the country “for which protection . . . is 
sought”;189 presumably, this provision covers both issues of ownership and 
infringement.  In Poland, the Act on Private International Law190 addresses 
IP ownership and other issues separately from IP infringement issues; ac-
cording to Article 46 of the Act, the law of the country in which an IP right is 
exercised governs the creation, content, and termination of the right, and 
also its transfer and issues of priority.191  Additionally, Article 47 of the Polish 
Act sets the law applicable to an employment relationship as the law govern-
ing any IP that arises from the employment relationship.192 
For infringements of IP rights, countries typically select the law of the 
protecting country, which corresponds to the principle of territoriality of IP 
rights.193  Choice of law governing the infringement of IP rights is addressed 
specifically in the Polish Act on Private International Law, according to 
which the law of the protecting country governs the protection of the 
right.194  The Chinese Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civ-
il Relations of the People’s Republic of China sets the law of the country 
where protection is claimed as the law applicable to infringement.195  Some 
countries have taken an interesting step to promote party autonomy by allow-
ing litigating parties to agree—after an IP infringement has occurred—on 
the law that will apply to the infringement.  The Swiss Federal Act and the 
Chinese Law allow parties to agree, after an infringement has occurred, that 
the law of the forum will apply to the infringement of IP rights.196 
                                                        
 188.  IPRG, art. 109, para. 1 (Switz.). 
 189.  Id. at art. 110, para. 1. 
 190.  PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Feb. 4, 2011), O.J. 2011 No. 80, item 432, arts. 46–
47 (Pol.). 
 191.  Id. at art. 46, para. 1–2. 
 192.  Id. at art. 47.  In China, according to the Law of the Application of Law for For-
eign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of China, the “ownership and con-
tents” of IP rights are governed by the law of the country in which protection is sought.  
Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic 
of China (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 11th Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 
28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011), art. 48 (China).  In Portugal and Belgium conflict of laws 
rules distinguish between rules applicable to copyright (the author’s right) and industrial 
rights (such as trademarks and patents). 
 193.  See supra Part III for a discussion of the principle of territoriality. 
 194.  PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Pol.), at art. 46, para. 3. 
 195.  Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s 
Republic of China, at art. 50. 
 196.  IPRG (Switz.), at art. 110, para. 2; Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-
Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of China, at art. 50.  Parties to an in-
fringement dispute may achieve the same result in legal systems that have facultative 
choice of law.  Facultative choice of law exists in legal systems where courts do not have an 
obligation to conduct ex officio a choice of law analysis and/or forum law applies unless 
  
2015] ADVANCING NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 247 
IP-specific rules concerning the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments on IP are rare; typically, general rules on recognition and 
enforcement apply to foreign judgments on IP.  The Swiss Federal Act on In-
ternational Private Law is one example of national legislation that specifically 
addresses the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on IP; the 
Act provides in Article 111 that foreign judgments on IP will be recognized 
only if the country in which the judgment was issued is either (a) the country 
where the defendant is domiciled, or (b) the country of the place of the tor-
tious activity or the place of the effects of such activity and the defendant is 
not domiciled in Switzerland.197 According to Article 111, foreign decisions 
concerning the validity or registration of IP rights will be recognized if the 
country in which the judgment was issued is the country for which protection 
was sought, or if the decision was recognized there.198 
B.  Court-Created IP-Specific Conflict of Laws Rules 
When legislation does not provide IP-specific conflict of laws rules, 
courts may develop such rules.  The situation in the United States is an ap-
propriate example because personal jurisdiction statutes and statutes on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments include no IP-specific 
rules, nor do choice of law rules address IP issues specifically.  Two U.S. court 
decisions exemplify the development of IP-specific rules and approaches in 
the United States.  The first decision, which concerns the jurisdiction of 
courts in cases concerning foreign patents, is a 2007 decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The decision clarified that, alt-
hough U.S. courts may have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in cases 
that concern non-U.S. patents, supplemental jurisdiction cannot be used as 
the basis for U.S. court subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving for-
eign patents.199 
The second U.S. decision that exemplifies how courts create conflict of 
laws rules for IP concerns the choice of law applicable in copyright cases.200  
                                                        
parties invoke and/or plead and prove applicable foreign law.  De Boer, supra note 56, at 
269. 
 197.  IPRG (Switz.), at art. 111, para. 1.  
 198.  Id. at art. 111, para. 2. 
 199.  28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  It is 
unclear whether the court foreclosed any jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts in cases involv-
ing foreign patents; since 2007 at least one federal district court has interpreted the deci-
sion to allow U.S. federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction in cases involving foreign 
patents in which the validity of the foreign patents is not contested.  Fairchild Semicon-
ductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Me. 
2008). 
 200.  Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency v. Russ. Kurier Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).  Alt-
hough the decision is binding only in the Second Circuit, the choice of law approach has 
also been followed in other circuits.  See, e.g., Edmark Indus. SDN. BHD. v. S. Asia Int’l 
(H.K.) Ltd., 89 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843–44 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Lahiri v. Universal Music & Vid-
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In a 1998 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit estab-
lished an approach to choice of law in copyright cases.201  First, the court 
performed a dépeçage202 and divided the issues of copyright ownership and 
copyright infringement for the purpose of conducting a choice-of-law analy-
sis.203  Second, the court articulated and applied different rules to the copy-
right ownership and the copyright infringement;204 because the court was 
deciding a federal question case, it derived the rules from the Restatement (Se-
cond) of Conflict of Laws.205  For copyright ownership, the court looked to “the 
law of the [country] with ‘the most significant relationship’ to the property 
and the parties” as provided in the Restatement (Second) for property in gen-
eral, and rejected any determination of which country’s law would apply 
based on the rule of the “country of origin” included in the Berne Conven-
tion.206  For copyright infringement, the court applied the lex loci delicti 
rule—the rule that calls for the application of the law of the country in which 
the tort took place.207 
As shown in Voda and Itar-Tass, courts are certainly capable of creating 
IP-specific rules and developing approaches for the application of general 
conflict of laws rules to IP cases.  The question is whether courts are in the 
best position to develop rules and approaches in a manner that is consistent 
with the promotion of national IP policies; legislators, as the policy makers 
and drafters of legislation that should meet national IP policy goals, should 
be better positioned than courts to see the entire picture and craft conflict of 
laws while respecting the goals of current national IP policies.  Of course, 
proposals for special conflict of laws rules for IP cases that have been pre-
pared by several expert groups208 can now assist courts when they develop IP-
                                                        
eo Distribution, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Saregama India Ltd. 
v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 201.  Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency, 153 F.3d 82. 
 202.  Dépeçage means “applying the rules of different states to determine different is-
sues.”  Willis L. M. Reese, Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. 
REV. 58, 75 (1973). 
 203.  Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency, 153 F.3d at 90. 
 204.  Id. at 90–92. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 90.  At the same time, the court pointed out the limitation on standing to sue 
for copyright infringement; under the U.S. Copyright Act, only an owner of an exclusive 
right may file a copyright infringement suit.  Id. at 91.  One author concluded that by ap-
plying the Restatement (Second) rule “the United States has effectively adopted a lex originis 
rule on copyright authorship.”  Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 731. 
 207.  Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency, 153 F.3d at 91.  Although the Restatement (Second) de-
parted from the earlier strict territorial approach that generated rules such as the lex loci 
delicti rule, the court still chose to apply the lex loci delicti rule and explained that in this 
case the result would have been the same under the rule of the Restatement (Second), which 
calls for an evaluation of several factors, because the country of the place of the tort was 
also the country of defendant’s domicile.  Id. 
 208.  See supra notes 10–11 and the accompanying text. 
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specific conflict of laws rules and approaches; some courts have already 
turned to these proposals for guidance,209 and extensive commentaries to 
some of the proposals help courts understand the effects that the proposed 
conflict of laws rules might have.210  Even with the assistance of the expertise 
contained in the proposals, it is unrealistic to expect courts to design IP-
specific conflict of laws rules and approaches that will fully incorporate cur-
rent national IP policies. 
C.  Alternatives to IP-Specific Conflict of Laws Legislation 
There might be various reasons for which legislators cannot legislate 
conflict of laws rules or amend conflict of laws rules without limitations.  In 
such instances, legislators may resort to alternatives to legislating conflict of 
laws rules.  One alternative is to embed the rules in IP legislation.  There are 
examples of this alternative in existing IP legislation; for instance, the U.S. 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,211 in the section that limits the liability of 
internet service providers for content posted on the internet by others, im-
poses an obligation on a subscriber (an alleged infringer) who objects to a 
copyright holder’s notification of infringing activity to include in a counter-
notification “a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of 
Federal District Court for the judicial district in which [his] address is locat-
ed, or if [his] address is outside of the United States, for any judicial district 
in which the service provider may be found.”212  The Act thus solves the 
problem of personal jurisdiction over an objecting subscriber who might 
otherwise be outside the reach of U.S. courts.  Similarly, the U.S. Patent Act 
solves the problem of possible lack of personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts 
over nonresident owners of U.S. patents;213 according to Section 293 of the 
Patent Act, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has ju-
risdiction over a nonresident patentee if the patentee did not designate a 
person residing within the United States for the purpose of service of pro-
cess, or if the patentee designated such a person but the person cannot be 
found.214 
Some national IP laws may also include a choice of law rule that accom-
panies a substantive mandatory rule;215 this so-called “internationally manda-
                                                        
 209.  See supra note 16. 
 210.  See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING 
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2007); EUR. 
MAX PLANCK GRP., supra note 10. 
 211.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 212.  Id. § 512(g)(3)(D). 
 213.  35 U.S.C. § 293 (2012). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Joost Blom, Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time, 50 
NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 373, 382 (2003).  These so-called “mandatory rules” “are, in 
effect, laws that include their own, unilateral choice of law rules.”  Id. 
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tory rule” is designed to override general choice of law rules because a court 
must apply the rule even when choice of law rules instruct the court to apply 
another country’s law.216  Mandatory rules are useful for expressing strong 
national public policies, and legislators and courts resort to them in special 
situations where national policies outweigh concerns about comity.217  For 
example, German legislators used mandatory rules for the provisions of the 
German Author’s Rights Act concerning equitable remuneration to au-
thors.218  According to Sections 32–32B of the Act, an author of a work is en-
titled to equitable remuneration, which may be adjusted during the lifetime 
of a contract to assure that the remuneration remains equitable, and if the 
parties do not agree on the amount of the remuneration a court may deter-
mine the amount for them.219  Section 32B makes the provisions on equita-
ble remuneration mandatory; parties cannot deviate from the provisions in 
their contracts, and the provisions apply “in so far as the contract [at issue] 
concerns substantial use in the territory governed by [the German Copyright 
Act].”220  Therefore, even if German choice-of-law rules instruct a German 
court to apply foreign law to a contract the court will apply the provisions of 
the German Author’s Rights Act to the issue of equitable remuneration.  The 
status of a provision as a mandatory rule will not always arise from an explicit 
designation in legislation; in some instances the status will develop through 
court interpretation.  In France, the rule according to which moral rights are 
inalienable under French authors’ rights is a provision that courts (in 
France) have interpreted as a mandatory rule.221 
                                                        
 216.  See Rome I Regulation, supra note 61, at art.9(1) (“Overriding mandatory provi-
sions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguard-
ing its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an ex-
tent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the 
law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.”); Code de Droit Interna-
tional Privé [C.D.I.P.] art. 20 (Belg.), translation, available at 
http://www.ipr.be/data/B.WbIPR%5BEN%5D.pdf (“[M]andatory or public policy provi-
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18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 21 (2007). 
 217.  See supra Part III for a discussion of comity. 
 218.  GESETZ ÜBER URHEBERRECHT UND VERWANDTE SCHUTZRECHTE [Law on Copyright 
and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I, as amended, § 32–32b (Ger.), translated by Wil-
liam Cornish in The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 14 (2003). 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  E.g., Consorts Huston v. Sté Turner Entertainment, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [su-
preme court for judicial matters] le civ., May 28, 1991, 149 R.I.D.A. 197 (1991) (Fr.); Loi 
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Mandatory rules are justified by strong public policies that the rules re-
flect, and strong public policies related to IP laws may also impact the design 
and application of conflict of laws rules even when the policies are not ex-
plicitly included in an IP statute.222  For example, the right to free speech 
under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has a strong relation to 
U.S. copyright law, but the right, although reflected in the U.S. Copyright 
Act, is not explicitly formulated in the Act.  Nevertheless, because copyright 
law reflects free speech protections the application of choice of law rules and 
the rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in copyright 
cases are impacted by the public policies that underpin free speech.  For ex-
ample, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used free speech 
concerns to apply the public policy exception and reject the recognition of a 
French judgment that was based on French law;223 the court reasoned that 
French law did not protect the defendants’ actions to the extent that the U.S. 
fair use doctrine would have.224  Because the U.S. fair use doctrine is an im-
portant outgrowth of free speech in U.S. copyright law, the court could rely 
on the protection of free speech as a strong public policy and apply the pub-
lic policy exception.225 
Finally, the application of conflict of laws rules is strongly linked to sub-
stantive IP laws whenever conflict of laws rules include a reference to the 
place of the tortious activity, such as a rule of specific jurisdiction that vests 
jurisdiction in the courts of the place of the tortious act or the place of the 
effects of such an act,226 or a choice of law rule that calls for the application 
of the law of the place of the tortious act or the place of the effects of such 
an act.227  Whether an act is tortious depends on substantive law; for exam-
                                                        
57-298 du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire et artistique [Law 57-298 of March 11, 
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L. 201 (2008). 
 223.  Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2007) 
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 226.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)–(3) (McKinney 2008); 735 ILL. COMP.STAT. 5/2-
209(a)(2) (1993); Brussels I Regulation (recast), supra note 22, at art. 7(2). 
 227.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 145 (1971) (listing 
among “[c]ontacts to be taken into account,” “the place where the injury occurred,” and 
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ple, whether a new product announcement can be a patent infringing offer 
to sell will depend on national patent law and its interpretation.228  Where an 
act occurred (the localization of an act) also depends on substantive law; for 
example, as mentioned earlier in Part IV, national law determines if a ship-
ment made “free on board” from a foreign country229 will result in a patent 
infringing sale that will be deemed to have occurred in the country of desti-
nation.230 
Through this link between conflict of laws rules and substantive IP laws, 
substantive IP laws supply input information necessary for the application of 
conflict of laws rules, and through this link the territorial reach of substan-
tive IP laws affects the operation of conflict of laws rules.  For example, un-
der Section 271(f) of the U.S. Patent Act, supplying or causing to supply 
without authority the components of a patented invention “in or from the 
United States,” is an act of infringement.231  The provision signals, for the 
purposes of choice of law, that even acts committed outside the United States 
(for example, shipping from outside the United States) may be found in-
fringing under U.S. patent law and therefore trigger the application of U.S. 
law to the acts.232  Adjustments to the input information can therefore lead 
to different results when conflict of laws rules are applied, and legislators can 
make adjustments to adjust the effective territorial scope of IP laws. 
                                                        
“the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 378 (1934). 
 228.  In some instances, intellectual property law will rely on another area of law to sup-
ply the meaning for a term used in an intellectual property act; thus, the territorial scope 
may depend on rules from other areas of law.  For example, some national patent laws rely 
on national contract law to define what constitutes an “offer to sell”; other national patent 
laws give the term an autonomous interpretation.  See, e.g., TRIMBLE, supra note 88, at 100–
05. 
 229.  See supra note 159 for an explanation of the term “free on board.” 
 230.  See, e.g., MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 
F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (a sale is not necessarily precluded from occurring in the 
forum “simply because an article is delivered ‘free on board’ outside of the forum”). 
 231.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012). 
 232.  Of course the determination of the tortious nature of the acts is a decision on the 
merits and not a decision that a court will make when deciding on its jurisdiction or on 
applicable law.  See, e.g., Litecubes, LLC v. Northern Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)  “[W]hether the allegedly infringing act happened in the United States is 
an element of the claim for patent infringement, not a prerequisite for subject matter ju-
risdiction.”  Id. at 1366.  The question of whether the U.S. Copyright Act applies to the de-
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VI.  CALIBRATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS WITH CONFLICT 
OF LAWS RULES 
The previous Parts established that the effective territorial scope of IP 
laws is the result of the interaction of substantive IP laws, conflict of laws 
rules, and countries’ enforcement powers, and that tools exist both in sub-
stantive IP laws and conflict of laws rules that legislators can utilize to adjust 
the effective territorial scope of national IP laws.  But how does the effective 
territorial scope of national IP laws relate to countries’ national IP policies?  
Why should legislators care about the effective territorial scope of national IP 
legislation (particularly any extraterritorial scope) when the legislators’ main 
objective is, naturally, to ensure that the legislation implements the policies 
domestically?  Two examples in this Part demonstrate how a country may cal-
ibrate its IP laws with its conflict of laws rules to achieve its desired effective 
territorial scope in its national IP laws and through an appropriate scope 
promote its national IP policy goals. 
Assume that a country, such as France, decides that it wishes to become 
a new global center for software development.  To effectuate this national 
policy goal, France strives to assist companies that invest in software devel-
opment by providing rules of copyright ownership that are helpful to the 
companies.  Given the collaborative nature of the software development pro-
cess and the high transaction costs associated with a multiplicity of copyright 
owners, France decides that its copyright law is disadvantageous to software 
development companies because the law has no work for hire doctrine that 
would vest copyright to all employee works in an employer; therefore, France 
adopts an amendment according to which copyright in software vests auto-
matically in the employer.233 
In fact, this is exactly what France did,234 and when French legislators 
adopted the legislation they very likely believed that this new provision would 
apply throughout France.  However, until recently nationwide applicability 
was not fully the case because French courts used the law of the country of 
origin as the law applicable to copyright ownership.  Therefore, copyright 
owners who could not claim France as the country of origin of their software 
could not benefit from the new French provision on software copyright own-
ership.  For example, the conflict of laws rule for copyright ownership in-
creased transaction costs for the companies that developed new software in 
France but were also dealing with older software developed and published by 
others outside of France.  The rule also meant that anyone who sued in 
                                                        
 233.  CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L113-9 (Fr.) (“Unless other-
wise provided by statutory provision or stipulation, the economic rights in the software and 
its documentation created by one or more employees in the execution of their duties or 
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France for infringement of copyright to software could benefit from the 
French copyright ownership rule only if France was the country of origin of 
the software. 
It was only recently, in April 2013, that the French Supreme Court 
changed the choice of law rule for copyright ownership to the law of the pro-
tecting country, meaning that French law will now govern questions of copy-
right ownership even for software whose country of origin is not France.235  
While this may surprise some who believe that they are copyright owners in 
France (because they are, for example, copyright owners under U.S. law) but 
who in fact might no longer be copyright owners in France (because French 
law does not afford them copyright ownership), software development com-
panies will benefit from the French approach if the country of origin of the 
software at issue would not have afforded them copyright ownership (which 
may be the case in other civil law countries without a work for hire doctrine 
and without any special provisions on software copyright ownership). 
One might ask why a country would opt for an approach to copyright 
ownership that uses the law of a country other than the protecting country; 
after all, the rule that uses the law of the protecting country to govern copy-
right ownership appears to maximize the effects of national policies by ex-
tending a country’s approach to copyright ownership beyond the borders of 
the country whenever infringement of copyright is litigated in the country or 
other reasons arise to determine ownership of copyright in the country.  
However, the choice of law rule that selects the protecting country is not 
suitable for all countries and all national policies.  A small country with a 
unique language may be a net importer of motion pictures and wish to assist 
motion picture importers by respecting copyright ownership rules in the 
countries of origin of the motion pictures.  Concomitantly, it might not be 
palatable for the small country to accept the same copyright ownership rules 
that exist in the countries from which most motion pictures are imported; 
perhaps the small country sees other copyright ownership rules as more fa-
vorable to its struggling native film industry.  In this situation, the choice of 
law rule of the law of the country of origin reflects national policy goals bet-
ter than the law of the protecting country. 
The operation of the internet affords a good example of the interaction 
of IP laws and rules of jurisdiction.  Assume that a person with no physical 
presence in a country publishes material on the internet and thus commits 
an act that would normally infringe copyright in that country.  Copyright in-
fringement is a strict liability offense; it does not require intent, and anything 
above a de minimis infringement236 will suffice for infringement to be found, 
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unless the fair use defense237 or other defenses apply.  However, even if the 
person appears to have infringed copyright in the country, the person can be 
outside the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the country’s courts if the person is 
not subject to the courts’ general jurisdiction and the country’s rules of spe-
cific jurisdiction require that the alleged infringer direct his actions at the 
forum state.  The jurisdictional rule is thus a limitation on the territorial 
reach of the country’s substantive law of copyright infringement,238 particu-
larly if the courts of only the country of infringement would consider the 
country’s copyright law to be applicable (meaning that there is no other 
country whose courts have jurisdiction and that those courts would apply the 
first country’s copyright law).  Of course, if the substantive law is not intend-
ed to punish an alleged infringer in situations when the infringing material 
happens to travel into the territory of the protecting country inadvertently, 
without the infringer’s actions,239 it may be that the country’s rules of juris-
diction are actually aligned with the territorial scope of its substantive law.  If 
the rules of jurisdiction do not correspond to the country’s IP policies, how-
ever, the rules may need to be adjusted to serve the policies. 
The primary locus of national IP policies will always be in national sub-
stantive IP laws, which will reflect and implement the policies and do so not 
only through the substance but also through the territorial scope that they 
will convey.  When focusing on the territorial design of IP laws, however, leg-
islators must consider the role of conflict of laws rules and the degree to 
which the rules comport to the reaching of the goals of national IP policies.  
The focus on the territorial scope of U.S. federal IP legislation may have to 
concern Congress more now than it did previously because of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s strengthening of the presumption against extraterritoriality240 
and the potential need to re-evaluate when an extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law is desirable.  The interest in the territorial scope of IP legislation 
should generate a debate about national IP policies in a transnational con-
text and the potential need for federal legislation on conflict of laws. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The increasing frequency and intensity of cross-border activities con-
cerning IP has highlighted the importance of delineating the reach of na-
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tional IP laws; the rising numbers of cross-border disputes concerning IP 
rights are now testing the effects of this reach.  Clarifying the effective terri-
torial scope of national IP laws is not merely a matter of mechanically legis-
lating substantive laws; the process of delineating the effective reach of the 
laws must include considerations of national IP policies and reflect those pol-
icies in the laws’ effective territorial scope.  Nor can the implementation of 
national policies continue to be based solely on the regulation of purely do-
mestic activities, with cross-border activities being treated as insignificant out-
liers.  The increasing frequency and intensity of cross-border activities re-
quire that legislators consider the territorial scope of national laws when they 
decide on how to implement national policies. 
For the effective territorial scope of national laws to be consistent with 
national policies, the territorial scope of national substantive laws must be 
calibrated with conflict of laws rules.  Legislators need to concentrate on 
more than just defining the territorial scope of substantive laws; while the 
territorial limits of prescriptive jurisdiction are important, the limits of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction alone do not define the effective territorial scope of na-
tional laws.  The effective territorial scope of national laws depends on the 
interaction of the territorial scope of substantive laws, conflict of laws rules, 
and countries’ enforcement powers.  Because the territorial scope of the en-
forcement power is usually not readily adjustable, legislators must focus on 
the interaction of substantive laws and conflict of laws rules and aim to make 
whatever adjustments are necessary to both areas of law so that desired na-
tional policies will be implemented.  In countries that have recognized this 
interaction legislators have developed special conflict of laws rules targeted 
at implementing specific national policies in IP disputes. 
For the United States, the challenge is that while Congress legislates 
federal IP matters, Congress has been rather passive in the conflict of laws 
area.  Unless Congress engages in designing conflict of laws rules, its ability 
to shape the territorial scope of federal IP laws in a manner that is beneficial 
to the implementation of national IP policies will be limited.  Of course 
courts may succeed in adjusting the design and application of conflict of laws 
rules to respect national IP policies; however, it is unrealistic to expect courts 
to take into consideration the full scope of the policies, particularly when the 
courts lack information about the future trajectory of the policies. 
The fact that the effective territorial scope of national laws can be ad-
justed only through the calibration of the territorial scope of national sub-
stantive laws and conflict of laws rules also has important consequences at 
the international level.  Even if national legislators calibrate IP laws and con-
flict of laws rules according to the goals of national IP policies, the success of 
the calibration may be curtailed by other countries’ conflict of laws rules.  
These rules continue to be “moving pieces” until countries agree to set uni-
form standards for conflict of laws rules; only if countries agree on uniform 
conflict of laws rules can legislators operate with clarity about other coun-
tries’ rules.  Even an agreement on conflict of laws rules, however, will not 
suffice to secure international uniformity in the effective territorial scope of 
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national IP laws; for such uniformity countries would need to calibrate their 
conflict of laws rules and the territorial scope of national IP laws at the inter-
national level to the same degree that they need to calibrate them at the na-
tional level.  There can be no international uniformity in the effective terri-
torial scope of national IP laws without a coordinated international approach 
involving both the territorial scope of national IP laws and conflict of laws 
rules.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that international uniformity can be 
achieved in the foreseeable future; given recent developments in interna-
tional IP negotiations, it is unlikely that the IP area will soon see any new ex-
tensive treaty activity, and the Hague Conference’s Judgments Project may 
prove as challenging now as it did in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Despite the continuing challenges, the Judgments Project and recent 
academic projects focusing on the intersection of IP law and conflict of laws 
rules have been and continue to be successful at bringing experts in the two 
fields together and producing a wealth of materials for future discussion.  At 
national levels the interaction of the two areas often seems to be overlooked 
or underestimated.  Conflict of laws rules are sometimes perceived as rigid 
and subject to their own sets of rules and policies, and therefore unsuitable 
for reflecting national policies specific to a substantive area of law, such as IP 
law.  As this Article points out, this perception of conflict of laws is incorrect, 
and national legislators should examine the rules when they seek tools to 
implement various national policies, including IP policies. 
 
 
